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2009 
2008 
2007 
January: Hrant Dink murdered 
March: First YouTube ban 
July: AKP’s second reelection 
August: Abdullah Gül becomes 
president 
December: Sabah-ATV sold to 
Çalık Holding 
September: Doğan Media 
Group fined $2.5 billion 
March: Hasan Cemal fired 
from Milliyet 
May: Alcohol ban passed; 
Cengiz İnşaat wins Istanbul 
airport bid 
May-July: Gezi Park protests 
August: Ergenekon trials end in 
convictions; Can Dündar fired 
from Milliyet 
October: Headscarf ban 
removed 
November: Erdoğan condemns 
student shared housing; Bill to 
close preparatory schools 
proposed 
December: Corruption probes 
launched; 3 MPs announce 
resignation from the AKP 
March: Nedim Şener and Ahmet 
Şık arrested 
April: Doğan forced to sell 
Milliyet and Vatan 
June: AKP’s third reelection 
 
January: First arrests in 
Ergenekon case 
March-July: AKP closure case  
September: Deniz Feneri case 
November: Procurement law 
amendments passed 
 
January: Operation 
Sledgehammer revealed 
June: Gaza Flotilla Incident – 
Gülen split 
September: Turkey approves 
new Constitutional referendum, 
reforming judicial structures 
February: Interrogation of Chief 
of MİT 
March: Controversial 4+4+4 
education bill passed 
May: Erdoğan calls abortion 
“murder” 
January: Purge of police and 
judiciary 
February: Internet law passed; 
HSYK law passed, bill to close 
preparatory schools passed 
March: Twitter and YouTube 
ban passed; AKP wins local 
elections 
April: Twitter and YouTube ban 
overturned; HSYK law 
overturned; MİT law passed 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) promised 
a new and democratic Turkey in the 2002 general elections. It promised full 
implementation of fundamental rights and freedoms, reforms of corrupt institutions, a 
booming economy, and the symbolic European Union membership. The Turkish citizens 
remembered the past few decades of instability, mired by political corruption and 
assassinations, recurrent military coups, and economic crises marked by persistently high 
rates of inflation. The AKP promised change and a new era. Hopes were high in Turkey, 
and the AKP succeeded in winning the votes of the Turkish people in the elections of 
2002, 2007, and 2011. 
 Indeed, the past twelve years of AKP rule have improved the lives for many 
Turks, bringing stability and prosperity. In its first term, the AKP succeeded in 
establishing free and fair elections, greater freedoms for religion and media, better 
relations with the Kurds, and a growing economy – a commendable transformation. 
Everyone lauded the democratization process in Turkey under the AKP, calling it the 
“Turkish model” for its Muslim neighbors, as it demonstrated Islam’s compatibility with 
democracy. The Turkish democratic transition was to be an example for its Arab 
neighbors to follow, and there were hopes that Turkey would emerge as a soft power in 
the region, inspiring political reform in the Middle East.  
Yet, with the prolonging rule of the AKP, this positive and promising image of 
Turkey has begun to tarnish. Cracks in the Turkish democracy gradually appeared after 
the AKP’s second reelection in 2007, ranging from politicized trials to media repression. 
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The situation in Turkey continued to worsen at an increasing pace under Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, leading to the major Gezi Park protests last summer. The protests 
shocked international observers, who completely overlooked the impact of the AKP’s 
gradual but increasingly noticeable attempts at taking control. The erosion of the AKP’s 
commitment to Turkish democracy was finally evident, as was Turkey’s democratic 
backsliding. But where did Turkey’s democracy disappear? When did Turkey’s 
democracy start to deteriorate, and how did this emerging model reverse course away 
from the path of consolidating democracy? 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive landscape of domestic 
events in Turkey that demonstrate democratic backsliding by identifying major issue 
areas where this trend is most prominent. These key issues where democratic backsliding 
becomes most apparent in Turkey are divided into five categories: media freedoms, the 
judiciary, corruption and graft, the nature of the opposition, and civil liberties. These five 
categories will be examined in this paper through narratives, which provide crucial 
insight on the domestic political dynamics that are undermining democracy in Turkey. 
The same government party that inspired democratic consolidation also prompted its 
decline, and this paper highlights the strategies used by the AKP to undermine the 
consolidation of liberal democracy in Turkey. Moreover, these insights yield a broader 
understanding of democratic backsliding and its determinants, showing prominent areas 
in the domestic sphere that need special and increased attention in order to prevent 
executive attempts to undercut democratic gains. The democratic reversal in Turkey was 
unexpected by many, and many are at a loss at how to respond to this decline of a 
strategically crucial player in the world. Thus, the findings from the critical case study of 
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Turkey can be instrumental in preventing the trend of democratic backsliding in other 
developing countries. 
In order to better make sense of the Turkish trend of democratic backsliding, the 
theories of democracy must be examined, including theories determining democratic 
transitions and democratic reversals. After examining the relevant literature, this paper 
will summarize the history of Turkey’s unique experience in democratic transition, 
highlighting the role of the AKP in this transition. The bulk of this paper will focus on the 
five key issues areas and the AKP’s role in undermining them. This will be followed by 
future recommendations for Turkey and other relevant international actors to deal with 
Turkey’s domestic crisis, concluding with a discussion on the wider trends and 
implications of Turkey’s democratic backsliding. 
 
Definition of Democracy 
The definition of democracy helps us better understand the processes of 
democratic transition or democratic reversal. There are many definitions of democracy, 
each containing certain aspects. Turkey has reached the status of an electoral democracy 
but still lacks the elements of a liberal democracy, which is the culmination of democratic 
consolidation.1 Thus, this paper uses Diamond’s definition of a liberal democracy that 
includes the following attributes: recurring, free, fair, and competitive elections with 
alternative political parties; full adult suffrage; broad protection of civil liberties, 
                                               
1 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Illusions about Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996): 34-51. 
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including freedom of speech and press; and rule of law that guarantees citizens’ political 
equality and due process.2  
 
Literature on Democratic Transitions  
At the end of the Cold War, literature on the triumph of democratic values and the 
global trend of transitions from non-democratic regimes toward democratic ones has 
dominated most Western discourse on political change. Literature has pointed to various 
determinants of democratization, including processes of civil society development, rule 
of law, electoral procedures, economic structures and policies, demographic factors, and 
integration across socioeconomic levels.3 Research has also emphasized the importance 
of external influences in addition to specific actors, including charismatic leaders, the role 
of civil society and elite pacts, and government structures.4  
Most of the literature on Turkey’s democratization process has identified 
Turkey’s quest for European Union membership as the main driving force. The EU 
conditionality of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria has induced Turkey to comply with 
democratic principles. According to research, Turkey would lag behind in terms of 
human rights and democracy if it was not for the goal of attaining EU membership and its 
conditionality on political and economic criteria.5 In addition to external influence, 
Türkmen analyzes the role of internal agents in Turkey’s democratic transition through 
the process of elite socialization, which is composed of Turkey’s business elites, the army, 
                                               
2 Larry, Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), 9. 
3 See: Dahl (1971); Huntington (1991); Diamond (1999); and Przeworski (2000).  
4 See: Banac (1992); Brezinski (2001); Linz and Stepan (1996); Fish (2001); Ishiyama and Velten (1998); 
and McFaul (1993). 
5 See: Arabacı (2008); Basdeki (2012); Göksel and Güneş (2005); and Uskul (2002). 
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the judiciary, and its state bureaucracy. He argues that because the conditions imposed by 
the EU was adopted by the government and reflected in the state’s discourse, Turkish 
elites accordingly internalized these democratic norms.6 
 
Literature on Democratic Backsliding 
However, since the mid-2000s, the democratization phenomenon has not only 
been stalling, but has been reversing. International studies on democracy all confirm a 
global trend of democratic backsliding. Freedom House found that in 2010 alone, twenty-
five nations went backward in freedom, whereas only eleven moved forward.7 Germany’s 
Bertelsmann Foundation reported that the percentage of “highly deficient democracies” 
has almost doubled between 2006 and 2010.8 Research by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit found that the average democracy score for 2010 was lower than in 2008, 
concluding that: “Democracy is in retreat. The dominant pattern in all regions…has been 
backsliding on previously attained progress.”9 Kurlantzik, in his book on democracy 
reversals, identifies an important point that victims of democratic backsliding have 
tended to be regional powers, such as Russia, Thailand, Kenya, Venezuela, Mexico, and 
Nigeria.10  
The reasons for democratic backsliding are complex and vary for each case – 
giving us few definitive conclusions for democratic backsliding globally. However, 
                                               
6 Füsun Türkmen, “The European Union and Democratization in Turkey: The Role of the Elites,” Human 
Rights Quarterly 30 (2008): 146-163. 
7 Joshua Kurlantzick, Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and the World Wide Decline 
of Representative Government, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 7. 
8 Ibid, 9. 
9 Ibid, 10. 
10 Ibid, 21. 
12 
 
literature tends to be divided into three main categories: structural, international, and 
domestic. The initial structural conditions of a country can facilitate backsliding, such as 
conditions of poverty, inequality, and ethnic fragmentation.11 Houle, on the other hand, 
indicates that the existence of different levels of inequality rather than overall levels of 
development can facilitate democratic backsliding.12 Moreover, it is important to note the 
sources of economic wealth and the way it is managed and distributed as this provides 
insight into whether the resource curse theory can be applied to democratic backsliding. 
Other structural factors include demographic elements as politicizing ethnic, nationalist, 
or religious conflicts can have detrimental implications on democracies.13 It is important 
to see how the politicization of identity of a certain population can impact various 
democratic functions. 
Just as international actors can exert positive influence on democratic transitions, 
they can also have negative impacts. For example, Russia has recently demonstrated its 
negative influence in Ukraine, as Russia prefers to maintain control over its neighbor and 
has no interest in seeing a democracy established in Ukraine. However, even democracy-
supporters, such as the U.S. and the EU, can indirectly encourage backsliding due to 
strategic and economic interests by staying passive and restraining from active criticism 
or imposing conditionalities. 
The third category of literature on democratic backsliding focuses on domestic 
political dynamics. Gibler and Randazzo emphasize the importance of an independent 
judiciary in maintaining democracy and argue that political manipulation of the court 
                                               
11 See: Kapstein and Converse (2008). 
12 Christian Houle, “Inequality and Democracy,” World Politics 61.4 (2009): 589-622. 
13 See: Snyder (2000). 
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systems is positively correlated with regime collapse across all types of regimes.14 
Kurlantzick illustrates the importance of maintaining healthy civil-military relations 
through the examples of Thailand, Hungary, and Kenya, which all experienced 
democratic backsliding.15 Additionally, literature has identified ineffective and divided 
opposition movements as a factor in backsliding, identifying the role of media freedoms, 
education, and political attitudes that can influence the extent of strength or weakness of 
pro-democratic opposition movements.  
 
In applying the literature to Turkey, arguments for structural, international, and 
domestic reasons can be made for its current democratic backsliding. Structural factors 
contributing to Turkey’s democratic backsliding may include the existing religious and 
secular tensions within the society and the strong nationalistic elements due to the 
Kurdish issue. Internationally, one may want to explore the negative effects of the 
stalling of the EU membership process and the reluctance of the United States to criticize 
its NATO ally. However, this paper will primarily focus on providing evidence for 
Turkey’s democratic backsliding from the domestic side, allowing readers to draw their 
own conclusions. A common trend that appears from these domestic factors is the role of 
the chief executives in undermining democracy by increasing its own power through 
various formal and informal ways. This paper will examine five domestic issue areas, 
presenting narratives to lay out the means for the centralization of executive power under 
the governing AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan, who have exerted control over the 
                                               
14 Douglas M. Gibler and Kirk A. Randazzo, “Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the 
Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding,” American Journal of Political Science 55.3 (2011): 696-709. 
15 Kurlantzick, Democracy in Retreat. 
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media, weakened the role of the judiciary through legal constitutional changes, exploited 
economic connections for personal gain, taken advantage of its ineffective opposition, 
and cracked down on civil society. 
On a last note, it is important to recognize that each of these issue areas are not 
exclusive and are inherently interlinked and intertwined. Events such as the Ergenekon 
trials have far-reaching effects that not only affect one area such as the independence of 
the judiciary, but also affect other key areas such as media freedom, demonstrated by the 
detention of journalists, such as Ahmet Şık. 
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II. HISTORY OF TURKEY’S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
 
Turkey’s transition to democracy was not a smooth process. Even after its first 
competitive elections in 1950, Turkey experienced a long period of democratic 
breakdowns and military tutelage. This chapter describes the evolution of the Turkish 
democratic system, concluding with the democratic achievements of the AKP. 
 
The establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 created a single party 
regime that radically transformed Turkish society. The founders of the Republic 
abolished the Caliphate, banned religious orders, established secular systems of law and 
education that replaced the shari’a and Islamic schools, and imposed western-style 
clothing. These reforms were imposed by a strong central government, despite resistance 
from some of its citizens.16 Under this cultural transformation, the Republic’s founders 
aimed to eliminate evidence of its past imperial system and in its place establish and 
consolidate its own regime and power based on secularism and a legal-rational basis.  
In 1946 as a result of many domestic and international factors, the single-party 
government made a transition to competitive politics, allowing for multiple parties and 
thus, free and fair elections. In the elections of 1950, the Democratic Party won against 
the Republican People’s Party (Cümhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), marking a historic 
transition to Turkish democracy.17 
                                               
16 Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” Turkish Studies 6.2 (2005): 169. 
17 Carmen Rodriguez et al., Turkey’s Democratization Process (New York: Routledge, 2014), 46. 
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For the next three decades, Turkey experienced cycles of democracy. Each cycle 
began with an election to mark a transition to a new rule. When the government’s 
performance did not meet expectations, a period of turmoil followed and was preempted 
by a military coup. Military intervention occurred in 1960, 1971, and in 1980, and it was 
not until the elections of 1983 when there was a return to civilian politics. The 
Motherland Party won an overwhelming majority under the charismatic Turgut Özal, 
whose primary goal was to reform and liberalize Turkey’s economy, leading to the 
privatization of many state assets and an increase in foreign investment.18 
However, the election of Özal to the presidency led to polarization and 
fragmentation within the party system. By 1995, the political party system was in 
shambles: parties disappeared, banned parties were revived in different forms, and the 
fragmented party system meant the return of coalitions. Furthermore, religiously oriented 
parties began to gain strength in the political system. A series of Islamist parties inspired 
by Necmettin Erbakan under his “Milli Görüş” ideology formed, one succeeding the 
other as each was banned by the Constitutional Court for violating Turkey’s secularist 
principle. The religious impetus finally broke through the Turkish political system when 
the Welfare Party won elections in 1996, causing uneasiness among the highly secular 
military. The next year, Prime Minister Erbakan was forced to resign by the military in 
what has been referred to as a “post-modern coup.” In 1998, the Welfare Party was also 
closed down by the Constitutional Court.19 
Its successor, the Virtue Party, was also closed in 2001, but this split the party into 
two parties. While those loyal to Erbakan founded the Felicity Party, another group of 
                                               
18 Rodriguez et al., Turkey’s Democratization Process, 46-59. 
19 Ibid, 60. 
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mainly younger politicians renounced an Islamist agenda and established the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). The AKP was led by Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, a former mayor of Istanbul who was convicted for making religious 
references in a public speech. Having drawn lessons from the history of Islamist parties 
such as the National Salvation Party and the Welfare Party, the AKP managed to present 
itself as being pragmatic but socially conservative. By seeking this balance and focusing 
on meeting the immediate needs of the Turkish people, the AKP quickly gained political 
traction and won the elections of 2002 with 34.3 percent of the vote. The national party 
threshold of 10 percent prevented representation of smaller parties, yielding the AKP a 
comfortable majority to dominate the government by itself.20 The election of the AKP 
into power led to a new phase in Turkish politics, marking the opportunity for democratic 
consolidation. 
 
Democratization under the AKP 
During the AKP’s first term, the government concentrated on fulfilling its 
promises made in the 2002 elections. The party prioritized economic growth to deliver 
Turkey from its major financial crisis in 2001. Incorporating the economic policies 
outlined by Kemal Derviş and sanctioned by the IMF, the government carried out large 
privatization schemes, kept inflation and the budget deficit low, and successfully 
attracted foreign direct investment. The economic success was exceptional: the Turkish 
                                               
20 Rodriguez et al., Turkey’s Democratization Process, 60-61. 
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economy grew an average 6.8 percent per year with exports increasing from $45 billion 
to $107 billion during the AKP’s first term.21  
The AKP’s main goal, however, was to obtain EU membership, and thus the 
government took major steps to consolidate democracy. In order to harmonize Turkish 
law with EU norms, the AKP made constitutional amendments for a total of 42 articles in 
the Constitution,22 improving the protection of fundamental rights, bolstering the rule of 
law, and limiting the military’s role in government by reforming the National Security 
Council.23 The constitutional amendments made in 2004 were one of the most significant 
steps in Turkey’s liberalization and democratization process. The amendments 
completely abolished the death penalty, strengthened gender equality, recognized 
international human rights norms, and abolished the controversial state security courts.24 
Moreover, these constitutional amendments were accompanied by a series of reform 
packages, known as “harmonization laws.” These were passed between 2002 and 2004 
and amended 218 articles of 53 laws, addressing issues of freedom of speech, assembly, 
religion, minority rights, and prevention of torture and mistreatment.25 
Impressed by Turkey’s accomplishments, the European Council voted to invite 
Turkey in December 2004 to begin negotiations for EU membership. Accession 
negotiations officially commenced in October 2005.26 The AKP hailed these reforms and 
advancements with the EU as proof of their commitment to restore and strengthen 
                                               
21 Sebnem Gumuscu and Deniz Sert, “The March 2009 Local Elections and the Inconsistent Democratic 
Transformation of the AKP Party in Turkey,” Middle East Critique 19 (2010): 58. 
22 Özge Zihnioğlu, European Union Civil Society Policy and Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), 114. 
23 Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Gençkaya, Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 73. 
24 Ibid, 66. 
25 Zihnioğlu, European Union Civil Society Policy and Turkey, 114. 
26 Ibid, 84-85. 
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Turkey’s democracy. Its achievements led to the AKP’s reelection in July 2007, when it 
increased its votes to nearly 47 percent.27 
But the AKP started its second term with a narrow agenda, focusing its 
democratization efforts on religious freedoms of its mainly conservative supporters, such 
as the removal of the headscarf ban. The AKP also failed to adequately address the rights 
of minority groups, especially the Kurds and the Alevis. As a result, increasing numbers 
from Turkish civil society began to criticize the AKP for pursuing an Islamist agenda and 
backing their own version of democracy.28  
Moreover, after the opening of EU accession negotiations in 2005, progress 
decelerated, leading to a loss of reform momentum. The failure to settle the Cyprus issue 
in addition to the reluctance of EU members, such as Germany and France, to enlarge to 
Turkey resulted in the suspension of talks on most accession chapters. This seriously 
blocked progress and resulted in Turkish perceptions that the EU was treating them 
unfairly because of the EU’s desires to remain a “Christian club.” This undermined the 
credibility of the EU’s conditions, causing the AKP to turn inwards to consolidate its own 
power base. As a result, Turkey’s domestic reform impetus has stalled, declining enough 
to start showing signs of democratic backsliding.29 
 
 
 
                                               
27 Gumuscu and Sert, “The March 2009 Local Elections,” 59. 
28 Ibid, 62. 
29 Paul Kubicek, “Democratization and Relations with the EU in the AK Party Period: Is Turkey Really 
Making Progress?” Insight Turkey 15.4 (2012): 43. 
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III. ESTABLISHING A MEDIA AUTOCRACY 
 
 Since the beginning of its second term in 2007, the AKP has been putting 
increasing pressure on the media in order to control and suppress independent journalism 
in Turkey. This clampdown on media freedom in the last seven years indicates 
democratic backsliding in Turkey. A free press is crucial to a democracy, allowing for 
constructive public debate while also providing accountability to the government. Yet, 
rather than creating a safe and autonomous space for journalists, the government has 
formed an environment that is hostile and even dangerous for journalists to report 
opposing views. Moreover, the negative government practices toward news media has 
primarily been led by Prime Minister Erdoğan, establishing an intimidating, powerful 
media autocracy.  
This chapter explores Turkey’s current state of diminishing freedoms of the press 
as the government has employed different tactics to suppress the media’s role in Turkey, 
including tactics of controlling media conglomerates, imprisonment, intimidation, and 
firing of journalists. This chapter provides supporting evidence of the government’s 
media clampdown through various narratives and events, demonstrating not only its 
intolerance of government criticism, but also its fear of the media’s ability to stir anti-
AKP sentiments. 
 
Controlling Media Conglomerates 
During the AKP’s second term, the media landscape has seen many changes in 
the ownership of media groups, specifically, into the hands of pro-AKP companies. 
21 
 
Despite these shifts, most companies have generally endeavored to remain in good terms 
with the government. This is due to the fact that most of the major media holdings in 
Turkey are large conglomerates with major economic interests in other sectors, such as 
construction or energy, and only a small percentage of their profits actually come from 
the media sector. Companies are often dependent on the privatization of government 
resources and government contracts for their business due to Turkey’s state-planned 
economy. In order to maintain good relations with the government to protect potential 
governmental contracts, companies are under pressure to limit political criticism, 
contributing to self-censorship.30 As the AKP focused on economic growth during its first 
term and carried out large privatization schemes, these conglomerates were eager to 
partake in this opportunity, resulting in a growing dependency on government favor. 
The government has maintained influence over the media by forcing out media 
groups critical of the government through heavy fines and reselling them to companies 
who are sympathetic to the AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan. The government in turn 
rewards these companies by offering government contracts. This was the case for 
Turkey’s two dominant media groups, Sabah-ATV and Doğan Media Group, as the AKP 
realized after its 2007 reelection that it needed its own propaganda system to promote 
itself and a way to silence critical voices from the opposition. 
The Sabah newspaper traditionally supported secularism in Turkey, backing a 
democratic and westernized Turkey. Yet, in 2007, the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund, a 
                                               
30 Max Hoffman and Michael Werz, Freedom of the Press and Expression in Turkey (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for American Progress, 2013), 10. 
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government agency, seized Sabah-ATV for “mishandling its initial public offering.”31 
Sabah-ATV was later sold to Çalık Holding, which was owned by Prime Minister 
Erdoğan’s son-in-law Berat Albayrak, with Albayrak’s brother responsible for the media 
unit. Moreover, two state banks, Halkbank and Vakıfbank, helped finance its $1.1 billion 
purchase, granting $750 million in loans. Since the transfer of ownership, Sabah’s 
editorial stance has also moved from being center-left to pro-government.32 
 The next year, Prime Minister Erdoğan used the case of Deniz Feneri (“The 
Lighthouse”) as a cover to target Turkey’s largest media company, Doğan Media Group, 
which was also associated with secularism since its support of the 1997 “post-modern 
coup.” Deniz Feneri was a charity for the Muslim poor, founded by a group with close 
ties to the AKP. However, the Doğan papers, Hürriyet and Milliyet, gave extensive 
coverage of a German court case that found the charity guilty of using its donations to 
buy property in Turkey. Moreover, the papers accused three Turkish citizens with close 
connections to the AKP of swindling tens of millions of dollars from the charity. In 
response, Prime Minister Erdoğan called for a public boycott of the Doğan papers that 
reported the scandal and labeled their reporting as lies.33 The next strike came in 
February 2009: the Ministry of Finance charged the Doğan Media Group with a $500 
million tax fine, which was raised that September to $2.5 billion, four-fifths of the entire 
company’s market value. The fine eventually forced Doğan to sell its papers Milliyet and 
Vatan to another pro-government company, reducing Doğan’s power in the Turkish 
                                               
31 Oray Ergin, “The Silence of Surrender: Erdogan’s War on Independent Media,” World Affairs (2013), 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/issue/novemberdecember-2013. 
32 Susan Corke et al., Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey (New York: Freedom 
House, 2014), 7. 
33 Oray Ergin, “The Silence of Surrender.” 
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press.34  
 The seizure of the largest media groups in Turkey under AKP control marked the 
beginning of the end of media freedom, revealing Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 
determination to assert more control over the media sector. 
 
Imprisonment 
 Turkey has the highest number of jailed journalists in the world with the 
Committee to Protect Journalists reporting 40 imprisoned journalists at the end of last 
year.35 The government has used this tactic in order to silence commentary on sensitive 
issues. According to a study conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe in August 2012, Turkish journalists were primarily imprisoned on charges 
related to the Kurdish question and the role of the military in Turkish politics: 68 percent 
were jailed due to the Kurdish issue, 13 percent due to the Ergenekon trials of alleged 
coup-conspirators, and 19 percent due to various other charges.36  
The high number of imprisoned journalists in Turkey is a direct consequence of 
overly broad anti-terrorism laws, including Article 314 of the Turkish Criminal Code and 
the Turkish Anti-Terror Law. For example, the Turkish Anti-Terror Law makes it a crime 
to “print or publish declarations or announcements of terrorist organizations.”37 The 
nature of these poorly-defined laws leave them open to abuse by prosecutors and judges, 
who have aggressively applied them through their own interpretation. Even after several 
rounds of reform, the anti-terrorism laws continue to target terrorist “propaganda” and are 
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enforced to prosecute any journalist trying to cover the activities of the PKK or other 
terrorist groups.38 
Moreover, the prosecution of journalists in Turkey demonstrates the flaws of the 
Turkish legal system as well as the government’s ease in using the courts to imprison 
opposing voices in Turkish society. In 2011, Freedom House reported that there are more 
than 4,000 lawsuits pending against journalists in Turkey.39 
 
Intimidation  
Another way the AKP has been clamping down on the media is through 
intimidation. Prime Minister Erdoğan has manipulated the media and prevented critical 
commentary for his party’s own political benefit, exploiting the fears of journalists and 
media owners of losing their job and reputation. He has frequently attacked journalists 
individually, including prominent journalists Hasan Cemal and Nuray Mert, who lost 
their jobs after these public defamations. Other journalists have been told by their own 
bosses to resist publishing government criticisms or had columns removed by the 
owners.40 This pressure manifests itself in direct pressure on media owners from 
government officials and more subtle forms of self-censorship from editors and 
journalists who are afraid of dismissal. Many conclude that it is not worth the risk to 
examine sensitive issues such as the PKK or the Ergenekon trial. 
 Though many of these instances of intimidation have been undisclosed, the 
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climate has drastically changed in the past few months when a series of wiretappings 
were leaked to the public – including the undeniable evidence of media manipulation. 
Listened to by millions of Turks online, the leaks revealed a phone conversation between 
Prime Minister Erdoğan and Fatih Saraç during the time of the Gezi Park protests, a 
conservative businessman with close connections to Erdoğan and the AKP. In 2012, 
Saraç had suddenly become the executive director of Habertürk newspaper and 
Habertürk TV, both top mainstream news sources. In the leaked phone conversation, 
Erdoğan furiously tells Saraç to immediately remove a news ticker on Habertürk TV 
broadcasting Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahçeli’s speech on the 
incompetence of the government to intervene in the Gezi protests. Saraç replies, “Yes sir, 
I apologize,” and makes subsequent calls to editors at the station to pull off the ticker.41 
In the latest events, local newspapers announced that Saraç’s name was removed from the 
masthead of the Habertürk daily as the Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors.42  
Tensions heightened a few days later on February 10, when Fatih Altyalı, editor-
in-chief of Habertürk, appeared on a television interview on CNN Türk. Altyalı 
announced in the interview that all of Turkish media is under government pressure, 
including Habertürk, creating a climate of intimidation in which media editors are unable 
to publish freely. “The honor of journalism is being trampled on. Instructions rain down 
every day from various places. Can you write what you want? Everybody is afraid,” 
Altyalı said on CNN Türk.43 
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In response to these recent accusations, Prime Minister Erdoğan has 
acknowledged some intervention in the media, but has defended himself by saying that he 
was slandered first.44  
 
Firings 
 If warnings are not enough to prevent journalists and editors from criticizing the 
government, they are fired, demonstrating the complete intolerance of the government. 
Hasan Cemal, one of Turkey’s most respected journalists for the Milliyet column, was 
fired in March 2013. After Milliyet published leak information on PKK leader Abdullah 
Öcalan and the occurring peace talks, Cemal had defended Milliyet’s actions, arguing that 
the paper had the right to disclose the information to the public. In response, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan publicly criticized Cemal, saying, “If this is journalism, then down with 
your journalism!” This public condemnation from the prime minister created immense 
pressure on the owner of Milliyet, who fired Cemal later that month.45 
 The Gezi Park protests last summer also led to unprecedented mass firings, 
exemplifying the AKP’s increasing suppression of the media. The total number of fired 
journalists due to coverage of the protests varies as the Gezi firings have continued 
throughout the fall. The Turkish Journalists’ Union reported 59 fired journalists on July 
26, but other media employees cite much higher numbers.46 When NTV Tarih, a history 
magazine owned by NTV, published a special “Gezi edition,” the entire staff was 
dismissed and the magazine closed down. Even after the protests in November, TRT 
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news owner fired two employees who had supported the protests via social media. 
However, the AKP and its supporters claim that the firings are not related to coverage of 
the Gezi protests.47 
Another of Turkey’s most prominent columnists, Can Dündar from Milliyet, was 
also fired as a result of the Gezi protests. After his columns were not published for weeks, 
Milliyet owner informed him of his dismissal in a phone call. Dündar wrote on his 
personal blog, “I was waiting it for a long time, it wasn’t a surprise...I’m not the first, and 
I won’t be the last.”48 
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IV. REDEFINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
The Turkish judiciary has become a political tool of the AKP over recent years, 
highlighting the judiciary’s undemocratic role in the Turkish political system. As the 
functions of the judiciary have become increasingly monitored under tight executive 
control, the independence of prosecutors and judges has eroded, undermining two 
precepts of a functioning democracy: the rule of law and the separation of powers. 
However, the Turkish judicial system has always been involved in Turkish politics. The 
judiciary has been a central component of shaping Turkey’s new modern state after the 
1961 Constitution established separation of powers between the legislature and the 
judicial system. The judiciary has traditionally strictly adhered to the Kemalist ideology 
of secularism. Using its own discernment, the judiciary has acted as an independent 
institution to target enemies of the state, repeatedly invoking Articles 68 and 69 of the 
Turkish Constitution to intervene in Turkish politics and close a total of 27 political 
parties for violating the principles of a secular Turkish state.49  
Yet, signs of a less independent judiciary began to appear since the second term 
of the AKP. As Prime Minister Erdoğan gradually gained control of the judiciary by 
installing judges and prosecutors sympathetic to his party, the judiciary has not only lost 
its independence, but has become a tool to target and weaken the enemies of Erdoğan 
rather than the state. However, Aslı Bali, Assistant Professor of Law at the UCLA School 
of Law, argues that the notion of judicial independence must be “redefined” in cases of 
democratic transitions. By using examples of controversial constitutional cases in Turkey, 
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she claims that because the judiciary has been separated from accountability to elected 
branches of government, it has become too independent and has aimed to protect the 
interests of the elite, thus hindering Turkey’s democratic transition.50 Yet, this chapter 
will present evidence that shows the negative effects of both sides – a Turkish judiciary 
that is too independent and a Turkish judiciary that is given more accountability to the 
elected branch of the government, which has resulted in the AKP’s exploitation of the 
judiciary for its own political purpose. The evidence provided in this chapter, however, 
will focus on creating a cohesive narrative to map out the gradual erosion of the 
independence of the judiciary. 
 
The Break  
The ruling AKP was not exempt from the judiciary’s target list. On March 14, 
2008, Turkey’s Chief Prosecutor filed a case to the Constitutional Court to ban the AKP 
and 71 of its members from politics for violating the founding principle of secularism.51 
The AKP barely survived: only six of the eleven court justices voted for closure, one vote 
short to shut down a party and bar politicians according to Turkish law. On July 30, 2008, 
the Constitutional Court announced its verdict but also fined the AKP $20 million, ruling 
that the party had shown signs of “anti-secular activities.”52 
Bali notes that this decision was a new development in the Turkish legal and 
political system as this was the first time the Constitutional Court had attempted to close 
an elected party in power, marking an assertion of independent authority to “close 
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demoratic channels for constitutional reform in Turkey.”53 However, this narrow escape 
of the closure case was the breaking point for the AKP – Erdoğan had made a mental 
note to find a way to check the independence of the judiciary and bring it under his 
control. 
 
Reforming the Judiciary 
When the AKP first came into power, the higher judiciary structures were 
dominated by hardline secularists. However, since the AKP’s landslide reelection in 2007, 
there has been evidence that AKP-supporters have been integrating themselves into the 
judiciary system. First, the AKP passed a law in 2007 requiring all judicial candidates to 
take an oral exam carried out by the Ministry of Justice, which is dominated by the AKP. 
This has helped pro-AKP appointees get into the lower levels of the courts.54  
In April 2010, the Turkish parliament began to debate constitutional changes 
proposed by the government. The constitutional amendments passed when voters 
approved them in a constitutional referendum in September 2010. Bali lauds the 
constitutional changes that were supposed to make Turkey more democratic, as the 
reforms regarding Turkey’s judiciary system represent an improvement in judicial 
accountability in her view.55 However, others, including Gareth Jenkins, a Nonresident 
Senior Fellow with the Silk Road Studies Program and a regular contributor to its 
biweekly Turkey Analyst, have questioned the motivations for the judiciary reforms, 
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concerned that “judicial accountability” means increasing AKP control over a 
diminishing independent judiciary.56 
The first amendment concerning the judiciary was the composition of the Turkish 
Constitutional Court, which increased the number of permanent justices from 11 to 17. 14 
are to be appointed by the President from a selected pool, and the rest are to be appointed 
by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The second amendment changed the 
composition of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), also increasing its 
size and putting it under increased control of the executive through the minister of justice 
and the undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice, who retain their seats on the board. 
Furthermore, the HSYK is the sole body to appoint and promote judges and prosecutors, 
giving the government more expansive scope within the judiciary.57  
As a result, when the election was held in October 2010, 16 of the HSYK seats 
were filled by the ministry’s 16 chosen candidates.58 Despite the democratic appearance 
of these reforms, the gradual replacement of secularist judges to AKP-supporters has 
ultimately allowed the AKP to exploit the judiciary for its own purposes – as seen in the 
Ergenekon investigation. 
 
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer Coup Cases 
The AKP and the military have historically had tense relations. Traditionally 
regarded as the protector of the Kemalist ideology, the military threatened to stage a coup 
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if the ruling AKP carried out its plan to appoint Abdullah Gül as president. The AKP 
defied the military and called for an early election for July 2007. When the AKP won, 
Gül was sworn in as president in August, leaving the General Staff powerless to oppose 
the votes of the people.59  
The Ergenekon case was first launched in June 2007 following the discovery of 
grenades in a house in Istanbul. However, it was not until after the AKP’s reelection in 
2007 when the case gathered pace. Ergenekon prosecutors claimed to have discovered a 
widespread, clandestine ultranationalist organization that had been responsible for illegal 
acts of political violence in Turkey over past decades. The organization was alleged to 
have plans to overthrow the current government by anti-democratic means and had a vast 
network of plotters, consisting of elements of the military and police, terrorist groups, 
nongovernmental organizations, gangs, journalists, politicians, and judges.60 
The first high profile arrests were made in January 2008, and the resulting trial in 
July of 86 individuals, including retired senior military officers, was initially commended 
as a success for democracy and normalized civilian-military relations. The Ergenekon 
case expanded over the years, and new evidence regarding coup plots and planned 
assassinations of top officials led to further police raids and arrests. In June 2009, the 
police charged active military officers, including Chief of the General Staff İlker Başbuğ, 
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after finding a 300-page document revealing a plan to subvert the AKP’s authority and 
abate the influence of Fethullah Gülen’s religious social movement.61  
In the midst of these trials, another military coup plot from 2003 was uncovered 
in January 2010. Labeled Operation Sledgehammer, the scheme aimed to undermine the 
AKP’s governance by bombing public buildings and creating border tensions with 
Greece, thereby justifying military intervention.62 326 active and retired military officers, 
including the former air force and navy chiefs, were convicted in connection with the plot, 
including former Army Commander General, Çetin Doğan.63 
The Ergenekon case was supported and propagated by an aggressive media 
campaign by pro-Gülen newspapers, television channels and internet websites. Yet, there 
was still no evidence that the organization existed. The only common factor between 
those charged was that they were all critics or perceived opponents of the AKP and the 
Gülen Movement. In March 2011, the arrest of two renowned journalists, Nedim Şener 
and Ahmet Şık, confirmed that the AKP was targeting its own critics. Şener wrote a book 
in 2009 about the possible involvement of the government in the murder of Armenian 
journalist Hrant Dink; Şık was writing a book on the Gülen Movement’s infiltration of 
the bureaucracy since AKP’s first electoral victory in 2002. Both journalists denied any 
involvement in Ergenekon and testified that their arrest was the government’s way of 
retaliation for their writings.64 
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The Ergenekon case finally reached an end on August 5, 2013. In this final trial, 
the court announced verdicts for 275 suspects, including high-ranking army members, 
journalists, politicians, and academics.65 As a result of the five-year court case, over 
1,200 people have been charged and more than 500 defendants have been convicted, 
including over 350 serving and retired military staff.66 However, this past March, former 
Chief of the General Staff İlker Başbuğ, who had been given a life sentence last August, 
was released from prison. Critics have speculated on his release, saying that it was a 
move by the government to form a common alliance with the military against the 
Gülenists. Others said the timing is not coincidental and that Erdoğan is using his release 
as a distraction from his own problems with the recent corruption probe and the 
wiretapping leaks.67 
In summary, the AKP has used the judiciary as an effective tool in weakening the 
opposition, using the Ergenekon trials to weaken the military which had initially 
presented itself as a potential challenge to the party. Concerns about the fairness of the 
trials led to conspiracy theories against the government, ranging from questions about the 
weak nature of the evidence, the clampdown on journalists, concerns about the over-
usage of terrorism laws for prosecution, and the prolonged pretrial detainment of some 
defendants. The Ergenekon case has demonstrated that the court trials are not determined 
by the principles of due process and the rule of law, but by executive political power and 
control of the judiciary. 
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The Final Clinch on the Judiciary 
The events after December 17 led to another clampdown on the judiciary. Not 
only have hundreds of prosecutors and judges been reassigned in a purge of the judiciary, 
but the AKP also proposed a new law regarding the Supreme Board of Judges and 
Prosecutors (HSYK), which was passed on February 26, 2014. The HSYK law increases 
government control over appointing judges and prosecutors by granting the minister of 
justice sole supervisory power over the HSYK. The law authorizes the minister of justice 
to manage the composition of all three chambers of the board and to initiate disciplinary 
procedures for HSYK members. According to the new law, the minister of justice needs 
to appoint new individuals to the HSYK within 10 days.68 After the law was approved by 
President Gül, the Justice Minister has dismissed judges, prosecutors, and the 
administrative staff of the HSYK, replacing them with AKP-supporters.69 The latest wave 
of purges in the judiciary was on March 23, where 271 judges and prosecutors were 
reshuffled, including those who were assigned to major cases such as Ergenekon and 
Sledgehammer.70  
The new appointments were an attempt of the government to bring the judiciary 
under its full control in an effort to cover up its allegations of graft. However, in the 
aftermath of the Constitutional Court’s repeal of the Twitter and YouTube ban, the 
Constitutional Court also overturned parts of the HSYK law on April 11. Erdoğan has 
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criticized the judiciary saying that judges should take off their robes and “start doing 
politics,” while also claiming that the court had been infiltrated by the “parallel 
structure.”71 
The decisions of the Constitutional Court to repeal the AKP’s authoritarian-like 
rulings provide some hope for Turkey’s democracy and the future of rule of law in 
Turkey. However, a healthy checks and balances must exist in order to create 
accountability. Bali says that judicial independence should be redefined to convey 
interdependence between the branches in order to create forms of judicial accountability. 
As seen in this chapter, this is true because total independence of the judiciary has 
resulted in a polarizing battle between the executive branch and the judiciary, leading to 
fierce clashes as both sides try to undermine each other.  However, this chapter also 
demonstrates the importance of an independent judiciary to check an increasingly 
authoritarian government. Moreover, there is a danger of too much interdependence, as 
the AKP has used the judiciary as a tool for its own interests. Turkey must agree on the 
definition of “judicial independence” in order to develop a system of accountability for 
both the judiciary and the other government branches to promote Turkish democracy. 
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V. BUILDING UP GRAFT THROUGH CONSTRUCTION 
 
 Ever since the AKP came into power, Turkey’s economy has nearly quadrupled. 
Indeed, the boom in consumption and the construction of countless shopping malls, 
residential buildings, and ambitious infrastructure projects seem to symbolize the rise of 
the Turkish economy. The construction industry has been crucial to this economic growth, 
accounting for over 6 percent of Turkey’s GDP and employing more than 1.5 million 
people.72 When taking the direct and indirect impacts on other sectors into account, 
Forbes estimates that construction accounts for $170 billion or approximately 20 percent 
of Turkey’s GDP of $789.3 billion.73 This unprecedented growth of the Turkish economy, 
supported through the construction sector, has led some to conclude that Turkey is set on 
the path towards democracy through its economic liberalization.  
 However, this growth in the construction sector has been intertwined with politics 
during Erdoğan’s years of power. As a result, transparency has dramatically declined and 
corruption has characterized the growth of the construction sector. This chapter focuses 
on Turkey’s increasing problem of graft, which has recently been publicly exposed in a 
major scandal in December of last year. This chapter will describe the relationship 
between the government and construction sector by providing examples of different 
holdings which have benefited from AKP rule. It will then delve into detail of the major 
December 17, 2013 graft probe and the resulting chaos it has created in the government, 
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bringing into question whether Turkey has been backsliding all along as corruption has 
been infiltrating politics. 
 
The Growing Relationship between the AKP and the Construction Sector 
Public construction projects have increased Turkey’s government spending by 
nearly two-thirds during AKP rule, and loans related to construction have grown by 42.9 
percent. Recently, Turkey’s government has launched an ambitious infrastructure project. 
Envisioned to be completed in the next decade, this $200 billion construction plan 
includes projects such as Istanbul’s third airport that is expected to be one of the world’s 
largest airports when it opens in 2019, costing $29 billion; a 26-mile shipping canal 
linking Marmara to the Black Sea, costing an estimated $15 billion; a $5 billion rail 
tunnel under the Bosporus; and a third bridge over the Bosporus that will cost $4.4 
billion.74 
The construction sector has been managed under the oversight of Prime Minister 
Erdoğan. The AKP led a massive privatization campaign, with sales of government assets 
totaling over $54 billion. Additionally, a new housing administration called TOKİ was 
established to manage land sales and was placed under the control of the prime minister 
shortly after the AKP assumed power, with the stated goal of “selling land for the 
creation of quality public housing.”75  
However, along with this massive campaign, transparency of public contracts has 
fallen dramatically in recent years. Laws regarding public contracts and the sale of 
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private lands passed by the AKP at the beginning of their rule were highly progressive 
and transparent in order to satisfy the EU’s demands. Since 2007, however, they have 
been amended dozens of times including the Public Procurement Law, making sales more 
opaque.76 According to Global Source Partners, the government had already revised the 
Public Tender Act 17 times. Additionally, more than 100 minor adjustments were made, 
giving ministries more oversight in choosing contract winners and reducing 
transparency.77 For example, a set of alterations to the Procurement Law in 2008 allowed 
the government to avoid the bidding process in situations where a certain company 
displayed “unique competence.”78 Global Integrity, a corruption tracker, ranked Turkey 
“weak” for transparency in 2010, down from “moderate” in 2007, noting the inability of 
media and state prosecutors to follow corruption cases.79  
Transferring state resources to the private sector under opaque laws has offered 
politicians ample opportunities to enrich their business allies. There have been increasing 
numbers of allegations of obscure privatization bids, land sales, and government tenders 
– mostly against businessmen with close ties to the government. Other times pro-AKP 
companies have obtained no-bid contracts, while state banks have been pressured to grant 
them generous loans. This was the case in Çalık Holding’s purchase of Sabah newspaper 
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and the ATV television channel, which was bought with the aid of loans from two state-
run banks.80  
The relationship between the construction industry and the AKP is clear: Pro-
AKP companies win the big government contracts. Favored companies of Erdoğan 
include Çalık Holding, which used to be run by Erdoğan’s son-in-law Berat Albayrak, 
and Cengiz İnşaat, which is run by Mehmet Cengiz, a founding member of a charity 
foundation at Recep Tayyip Erdoğan University along with Erdoğan’s son. Cengiz 
recently won the bid to build and operate Istanbul’s third airport for 25 years then transfer 
it to the government. According to Aykut Erdoğdu, the bidding process for this airport 
was switched from an open-bid model, where bidders and the public can see the entire 
tender, to a closed envelope model in the week before the winner of the bid was to be 
announced in May 2013.81  
 
Corruption Scandal of December 17, 2013 
 The obscure dealings involving allies of Prime Minister Erdoğan have recently 
been brought under the Turkish society’s light. On December 17, 2013, over 100 people 
were arrested or questioned as a result of a 15-month secret investigation on graft, 
ranging from bribes to bid rigging. Among the arrested were sons of three of Erdoğan’s 
cabinet ministers; Süleyman Aslan, the CEO of Halkbank a state bank; and Ali Ağaoğlu, 
one of the wealthiest men in Turkey due to his construction business. Millions of dollars 
in cash were found in some of the homes of the accused, most notably Aslan, who had 
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stashed $4.5 million in three shoeboxes. However, Erdoğan dismissed these 
investigations as a plot by foreign sources to hinder Turkey’s economic progress.82  
 The December 17 corruption probe was made up of three separate investigations. 
The first raid detained 32 people related to an investigation against Azeri businessman 
Reza Zarrab. Zarrab was accused of paying bribes to the sons of Erdoğan’s cabinet 
members and Halkbank CEO Aslan to enable and conceal illegal transactions of money 
and gold between Turkey, Iran, and Russia, in addition to obtaining Turkish citizenship 
for his relatives and his members of his alleged crime ring. Zarrab allegedly exchanged 
gold for cash in Iran in 2012 with the support of top politicians and Halkbank, which 
helped transfer a total of nearly $10 million of smuggled money. Halkbank was an ideal 
choice because it had no existing divisions in the United States, preventing traces of 
money transfers with Iran.83 
 The second probe was related to several companies which took bribes for illegal 
construction permits, causing tender rigging in the construction sector. Construction 
tycoon Ali Ağaoğlu, several heads of TOKİ, and members of the Ministry of 
Environment were detained as part of this second probe.84 
 The third probe was regarding Istanbul’s Fatih Municipality, which allegedly 
granted construction permits despite safety issues for the newly built Marmaray tunnel 
that would have arisen as a result of further construction. Additionally, Fatih 
Municipality was also accused of giving permission to a gang to construct buildings on 
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protected natural sites within the municipality’s borders. Fatih Mayor Mustafa Demir was 
among the 32 people detained as part of the probe.85 
However, since these arrests in December, all suspects have been released 
according to court decisions, including the sons of the former ministers and Reza 
Zarrab.86  
 
Implications of the Second Probe and TOKİ 
The second probe has highlighted the linkages between corruption and 
construction, symbolized by the “black box” of TOKİ. During the AKP’s rule, public 
housing has rapidly expanded under TOKİ, the sole administration responsible for the 
housing sector in Turkey. Erdoğan Bayraktar and Prime Minister Erdoğan had worked 
together on construction since 1994, when Erdoğan was the mayor of Istanbul. When 
Erdoğan’s AKP won its first parliamentary elections in 2002, Bayraktar was appointed to 
direct TOKİ, allowing Erdoğan to turn the administration into a more powerful and less 
accountable body, answering only to the prime minister himself.87 TOKİ works with 
private contractors to develop housing on public land, to which it has complete access, 
and it also decides land prices. Its activities are also audited by the High Audit Board 
(Yüksek Denetleme Kurulu), which is controlled by the office of the prime minister, 
allowing for less transparency in its financial transactions. Moreover, Atiyas found in his 
research that “TOKİ is exempt from the procurement rules which usually apply to public 
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entities (specified in the Public Procurement Act). While this exemption was origianlly 
limited to procurement for public housing projects, in 2011 it was extended to all 
construction undertaken by TOKİ.”88 
As a result of TOKİ’s extensive power to manage and redistribute land, TOKİ has 
constructed over half a million buildings in the last decade. Figures reported by TOKİ 
show that its land portfolio by the end of 2012 covered more than 118 million square 
meters and that its real estate holdings were worth more than $7 billion. Bayraktar 
managed TOKİ for more than nine years until his resignation, when he became the 
Minister of Environment and Urban Planning during AKP’s third term.89 Aykut Erdoğdu, 
an opposition member in parliament, has compiled a report on the TOKİ institution under 
Bayraktar. He cites lack of transparency over revenue-sharing deals and rigged bidding 
processes between TOKİ’s commercial branch, Emlak Konut, and private contractors, 
such as KC Group.90 Erdoğdu also accuses TOKİ of corruption in seven separate projects 
amounting to a total of $429.8 million. During the first investigation of the corruption 
probe, Murat Kurum, chief executive of Emlak Konut, and construction tycoon Ağaoğlu 
were detained for questioning, although both have now been released. 91 
During the December 17 corruption probe, Bayraktar resigned from his position 
along with the Interior Minister and the Economy Minister on December 25 after their 
sons were implicated and taken into custody. In a shocking move, Bayraktar publicly 
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invited the prime minister to resign with him, claiming that Erdoğan was behind most of 
the construction plans mentioned in the corruption probe and had pressurized ministers to 
execute his decisions.92 The fact that corruption has been pervasive within TOKİ, an 
administrative so closely linked to the government, demonstrates a failure of the 
government to uphold the rule of law. 
 
Prime Minister and Rule of Law 
Since the corruption probes, a series of wiretapping recordings have constantly 
been released on YouTube, revealing corruption within the office of the Prime Minister 
himself. One recording leaked on February 24 is a series of phone calls between Erdoğan 
and his son, Bilal, on the day the corruption graft began. In the recording, Erdoğan asks 
his son to immediately transfer large amounts of money kept in the houses of various 
family members. Later that day, Bilal calls his father reporting that most of the money 
had been relocated, but 30 million euros still remained. In five days, this recording has 
been listened to over 5 million times on YouTube. However, Erdoğan has denied all 
allegations and says that it is clearly a montage.93  
Corruption has pervaded Turkish politics and has severely undermined the rule of 
law. Government officials have abused their power for private gain. If the government 
cannot be accountable under the law, there can be no guarantee of democracy. 
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VI. EXPLOITING A WEAK OPPOSITION 
 
Despite its democratic structure, Turkey’s government has been dominated for 
over a decade by a single party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), and its leader, 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The recent local elections that took place on the 
30th of March demonstrate the domination of the AKP yet again, who won with 45 
percent of the vote.94 Moreover, the clear victory of the AKP despite the recent 
corruption charges, mass protests, and accusations of authoritarianism, indicates a 
malaise within Turkey’s political system: the weakness of the opposition against the AKP. 
Turkey’s democracy suffers from a lack of an effective opposition. Political 
parties are essential to democracy as they are a means of representing and expressing the 
needs of the citizens and provide policy choices that serve the best interest of the people. 
A true democracy has multiple parties with real competition. Yet, Turkey’s absence of 
effective political parties has resulted in a lack of incentive for reforms, hindering its 
democratization process. Even more problematic is the fact that the Turkish civil society 
movement has grown stronger over the years but does not view the alternate political 
parties as representing their needs. Özler and Sarkissian argue that the weak interaction 
between civil society organizations and political parties in Turkey due to increasing 
polarization has undermined Turkey’s democratization process.95 This is one of the main 
reasons why hundreds of thousands of Turks protested against the government last 
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summer – with no alternative party to convey their grievances against the government, 
people took to the streets in Taksim. 
This chapter first explores the characteristics of the AKP-dominant party era, and 
then it examines the reasons for the failure of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the 
Republican People’s Party (CHP) to gather votes. The third part of this chapter looks at 
the movement of Fethullah Gülen, which has become a major political force and source 
of opposition to the AKP in the past decade.  
 
Characteristics of the Turkish Party System 
 The party system since the 2002 elections demonstrates a number of important 
characteristics. The most evident is the dominance of the AKP in Turkish electoral 
politics, winning the parliamentary elections in 2002, 2007, and 2011 by 34.3, 46.7 and 
49.8 percent of the votes respectively.96 Other parties have not even been close to 
winning a majority in government over the past decade, excluding them from sharing 
power. 
The AKP’s control of the government has marginalized the parliamentary 
political opposition. Moreover, there appears to be a shift in the ideological preferences 
of Turkish voters from center-left to center-right. This has negatively impacted the ability 
for Turkey’s main opposition party, the center-left CHP, to expand its electoral strength 
to challenge the AKP in elections. Indeed, the CHP has continued to gain only about a 
quarter of the voter share in the past three general elections.97 This sense of 
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marginalization felt by its opponents has led to polarization not only in Turkey’s political 
system but also among opposition-party voters, especially the educated, secular, middle-
class who form the CHP’s electoral base. The prolonging AKP dominance has caused 
certain social groups to feel increasingly alienated from the government, creating a sense 
of hopelessness. 
 Third, Turkey has a 10 percent threshold for parties to gain seats in parliament, 
which has notably diminished the number of parties represented in parliament. In 2002, 
only the AKP and the CHP won seats in parliament. In 2007 and 2011, the MHP crossed 
the threshold in addition to members of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party 
(BDP) who ran as nominal independents.98 The high threshold used in elections adversely 
affects smaller parties, especially the pro-Kurdish parties, from participating in politics. 
 
The Failure of the Opposition 
 The 2014 local elections showed that the main opposition parties, the CHP and 
MHP, remain to be parties of certain regions. The MHP could only win a few provinces 
in the inner Anatolia region while the CHP continued to win the provinces that line 
Turkey’s west coast, including its token province of Izmir.99 This regional divide has 
existed for the past decade, showing their inability to find a way to reach out beyond their 
traditional base. 
The reoccurring geographical divisions in Turkish elections emphasize the reason 
why the two parties have been so unsuccessful: both parties have clear-cut identities that 
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exclude parts of the Turkish population. The MHP is unable to go beyond its nationalistic 
discourse to its audience, and it gives no hope for normalization since it adheres to its 
ultranationalist policies. In addition to opposing EU accession, it adamantly excludes 
parts of Turkey’s population based on ethnic issues – specifically, the Kurds. Because of 
its national appeals, the party cannot be a credible alternative in the southeast of Turkey 
which is predominantly Kurdish.100 
The CHP, on the other hand, is Turkey’s first and the oldest party. It is a center-
left party that has largely represented Turkey’s urban, westernized, secular communities, 
known for its enforcement of the Kemalist ideology. However, the Kemalist ideology is 
becoming old-fashioned, losing appeal to the majority of Turkish society. During the 
republican era, the CHP was associated with the modern coups and military tutelage 
regime, known for its notorious regulations to impose Kemalism. In the past, the party 
has also discriminated against the rights of different religious and ethnic sectors of 
society, especially devout Muslims, who were accused of being a threat to the secular 
state. As a result, it has traditionally been unable to attract more than about a quarter of 
the votes. Their positioning has caused a void between the party and the predominantly 
conservative population, reinforcing the polarization within society.101 Ziya Öniş, 
Professor of International Political Economy at Koç University, argues that one of the 
central differences between the AKP and the CHP is that the AKP is able to appeal to a 
broader range of Turkish society, whereas the CHP’s ideology makes it “inherently 
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incompatible.”102 Moreover, the CHP’s reputation has been tarnished due to incessant 
infighting and factionalism between the hardline Kemalists, who disapprove of the 
AKP’s conservative agenda, and the reformers, who still hold secular values but are more 
accommodating to ethnic and religious minorities. Trying to balance the two 
interpretations of secularism has caused fragmentation within the CHP.103 Its internal 
power struggles were worsened due to rivalries among leaders of the party, and its former 
leader Deniz Baykal was forced to resign amid a scandal in 2010.104  
After the change in party leadership for the 2011 election, the CHP under Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu has tried to pull away from Kemalism and has sought to reestablish the 
party’s legacy of social democracy. Yet, the CHP has continued to perform poorly in 
meeting the growing demand of Turkish society for reforms. Its proposals and projects 
have been unrealistic in terms of resources, and the CHP has resorted to populist rhetoric 
similar to that of the AKP to win the votes of the electorate. Moreover, the CHP has 
tended to focus on discrediting the AKP by emphasizing and criticizing its failures rather 
than propagating its own party agenda.105 
Both the MHP and CHP’s failures to formulate new strategies and policies to 
broaden their popular appeal continue to undermine their chances to present themselves 
as a credible alternative to the AKP. The opposition needs to reformulate its discourse in 
order to be more inclusive of other segments of Turkish society on the lines of ethnicity 
and religion. 
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The Gülen Movement 
The Gülen movement is Turkey’s largest Islamic movement, following the 
teachings of the retired cleric, Fethullah Gülen. The Gülen movement is an active force 
with interests in the field of education, business, and media in Turkey as well as in over 
one hundred countries around the world. Starting in Turkey as a network focused on 
education, the Gülen movement expanded to other sectors and gained the support of 
socially conservative entrepreneurs. In the early 1990s, Gülenists expanded their 
education, media, and business initiatives abroad, consolidating a mass source of 
income.106 Joshua Hendrick describes in his recently published book that Gülen affiliates 
have been “strategically ambiguous” in order to make mobilization around the world 
more successful. As part of this strategy, Gülen-affiliated institutions have insisted that 
each institution is independent from each other and that “there is no organic connection 
between these institutions.”107 Indeed, the Fethullah Gülen movement has risen to be one 
of the most important forces in Turkish politics, and their lack of transparency has led to 
the development of conspiracy theories involving a hidden agenda.  
Although it is not a formally-formed party opposition and actually denies any 
political connections, the Gülen movement has in reality been an extremely significant 
factor behind the AKP’s political success. Having both been formerly persecuted by the 
military and the secular elite, the AKP and the Gülen movement created a tactical 
alliance to curb the military’s role in politics. Moreover, the Gülen movement and the 
AKP shared a similar long-term vision of rebuilding the Turkish state and society by 
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“increasing the Muslim share in political, economic, and cultural power.”108 Thus, the 
Gülen movement has endorsed and promoted the AKP through the Gülen-affiliated Feza 
Media Group and its widely-read newspaper, Zaman, which has consistently sold more 
than any other Turkish newspaper since 2007.109 More importantly, the AKP benefited 
from the Gülenists who had infiltrated the Turkish bureaucracy, primarily the police force 
and the judiciary, in order to protect itself from the military. The AKP’s access to the 
bureaucracy greatly increased its power and control, facilitating its efforts to weaken the 
opposition as demonstrated by the Ergenekon trials.110 
However, this alliance with the AKP has progressively weakened and soured over 
recent years, and the Gülen movement has increasingly been challenging AKP’s authority. 
The first signs of tension appeared in June 2010, when Gülen and the AKP disagreed 
over sending a flotilla to aid the Gaza Strip, which was blocked by the Israeli navy. 
Ankara approved the initiative led by the İHH, a Turkish aid agency with close ties to the 
AKP, resulting in the deaths of nine Turks by Israeli soldiers. While the Turkish 
government glorified the Turkish “martyrs” and withdrew its ambassadors from Israel, 
Gülen criticized the campaign in the Wall Street Journal for unlawfully challenging 
Israel’s state leadership.111  
The movement’s dissension with the government continued, and it took the 
opportunity to use its affiliates within media, security, and judicial institutions to 
pressurize the government. Through its own media channels, it attacked Erdoğan for his 
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foreign policy positions – including its stance on Egypt, Iran, and Israel. However, their 
disagreement over the Kurdish issue led to a breaking point, as Gülen is in favor of 
granting the Kurds larger cultural freedoms. On February 2012, the state prosecutor 
decided to interrogate Hakan Fidan, the head of the Turkish National Intelligence 
Organization (MİT), for illegally negotiating with Kurdish parties. This was a direct 
challenge to Erdoğan as Fidan directly reports to Erdoğan, who now saw himself as the 
potential target for a charge of high treason. The AKP retaliated by introducing a bill that 
amended the MİT personnel law, offering comprehensive legal immunity for intelligence 
officials.112 
Erdoğan took this opportunity to publicly define the Gülen movement as a “state 
within a state” carrying out anti-government schemes.113 This perception was also fueled 
by the Ergenekon trials. The AKP had closely cooperated with Gülenists within the 
security forces and the judiciary to investigate the Ergenekon conspiracies, but the AKP 
also began to fear the Gülenists’ spreading influence in the bureaucratic system. A strong 
sense of distrust and fear of the movement began to develop. 
In November 2013, the government made its biggest move against the Gülen yet: 
a bill to close private preparatory schools in Turkey. The Gülen movement owns about a 
quarter of these schools, which provides a significant source of income.114 The bill passed 
in late February of this year, ordering the closure of nearly 4,000 preparatory schools by 
September 1, 2015.115 Adding to this outbreak, daily Taraf  leaked a document from a 
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2004 National Security Council (MGK) meeting, revealing that the government had made 
future plans to clampdown on the Gülen movement and its activities.116 
The Gülen movement retaliated swiftly: On December 17, Zekeriya Öz, an 
Istanbul prosecutor who was in charge of the Ergenekon trials and is widely believed to 
be affiliated to the Gülen movement, initiated the corruption raid on dozens of individuals. 
The timing of the announcement of this 15-month investigation suspiciously points to the 
Gülen movement’s involvement. Since the beginning of this corruption probe, the AKP 
blames the “parallel state,” in reference to the Gülen movement, of trying to undermine 
the AKP government through the corruption probe, despite their denial of any 
involvement.117 The government responded by purging and transferring thousands of 
police officers from posts in big cities including Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, in addition 
to reassigning nearly 200 prosecutors and judges.118  
In the latest news, the Turkish Parliament approved a law increasing the powers 
and immunities of the MİT, allowing it to monitor and investigate foreign operations.119 
The MİT bill can be viewed as a defensive mechanism against the other security organs 
and the judiciary, signifying Erdoğan’s suspicions and lack of trust in these institutions. 
The prime minister has accused the Gülen movement of orchestrating the December 17 
investigations and the wiretapping leaks to undermine the AKP. With the new bill, the 
MİT will be able to profile members of the bureaucracy to find these perpetrators and 
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spies allegedly part of the Gülen movement. Erdoğan has directly hit the heart of the 
Gülen movement. 
 
With the absence of an effective opposition, there is also an absence of checks 
and balances. The AKP’s extraordinary electoral success appears to have resulted in 
over-confidence, which is reflected by its increasing control over Turkish institutions and 
civil society. The AKP has progressively been less willing to tolerate opposition from 
different segments of the population, and this has serious implications for Turkey’s 
democratic backsliding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
VII. CURBING CIVIL LIBERTIES 
 
 In October 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan lifted the controversial, decades-old 
headscarf ban as part of a reform package by the government meant to improve 
democracy. It was a rare moment of advocating for personal freedom. In reality, Erdoğan 
has been adopting a more authoritarian stance and has been interfering more and more in 
the daily lives of Turkish citizens. Having already reformed Turkey’s institutions at a 
macro-level, Erdoğan has continued to press on into the micro-level by imposing his 
choice of morality and lifestyle on Turkish society, to the extent that it is infringing on 
Turkish citizens’ rights. Many have framed this micromanaging in terms of secular and 
religious tensions, as they accuse the AKP of attempting to reshape Turkish society along 
more Islamic lines. However, the tension is much broader than religious conservatism. 
Rather, the core of the issue is the authoritarian way in which the elected government is 
exercising its authority, despite its duty to guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms for 
all Turkish citizens. 
 This chapter is organized by the different areas which have been micromanaged 
by the government since 2011, when AKP won its third term. These developments 
affecting the lifestyles of Turkish citizens have been frequent but have usually been 
scattered and disconnected from one another. However, as a whole, they have great 
political significance, as demonstrated by the Gezi Protests during the summer of 2013.  
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Sale of Alcohol 
During the past four years, the AKP has gradually pushed towards banning the 
sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. In 2010, there was a sudden 45 percent tax 
increase on alcoholic beverages.120 The next year, the Turkish Tobacco and Alcohol 
Market Regulatory Authority issued a regulation forbidding liquor companies from 
sponsoring advertising campaigns or sport events. Additionally, the same regulation 
banned the sale of tobacco and alcoholic products from vending machines.121 Finally, in 
May 2013, an alcohol ban was passed: shops are prohibited from selling or displaying 
alcohol in windows between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., restaurants within 100 meters of 
schools or mosques are forbidden to sell alcohol, and liquor companies are further 
restricted in advertising and sponsoring events.122 In April of this year, Hurriyet Daily 
News published that Anadolu Efes, Turkey’s biggest brewer, is to shut down a production 
facility due to declining sales, which has declined about 15 to 20 percent since the new 
alcohol ban.123 Despite the fact that statistics show that only six percent of Turkish 
households consume alcohol,124 Erdoğan has cited health and safety of youth as 
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justification for the alcohol ban, insisting the aim is to stop young Turks from “wandering 
about in a state of inebriation.”125  
 
Conduct of Women’s Private Lives 
 Recently, the government has reiterated statements from 2008, recommending 
that women have at least three children. At a summit in Ankara, Erdoğan said, “One or 
two children mean bankruptcy. Three children mean we are not improving but not 
receding either. So, I repeat, at least three children are necessary in each family.”126  
Thousands of women and activists protested throughout the country when 
Erdoğan brought the issue of abortion to public debate in May 2012. Calling abortion 
“murder,” Erdoğan tried to pass a bill that would slash the time limit for abortions. Since 
1983, abortion was legal up to the tenth week of pregnancy. Turkey has a 14.8 percent 
abortion rate compared to 18.9 percent in the United States, according to a 2011 United 
Nations Population Division study. In addition to abortion, Erdoğan sought to restrict the 
number of births by caesarean section, a practice which has increased to more than 45 
percent in 2011, according to the Turkish Health Ministry.127 However, the Turkish 
government has temporarily dropped plans for the controversial bill.128  
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Education and Dorms 
 In March 2012, the AKP passed a controversial school bill that changed the 
structure of compulsory education. The bill increases compulsory education from eight to 
twelve years, dividing the twelve years into three tiers, hence the term, “4+4+4.” By 
adding an additional four years, students in the middle tier are now allowed to attend the 
religious “imam-hatip” schools rather than have to wait till after high school. Moreover, 
the bill added two new elective subjects to the general curriculum after the first tier of 
four years called “The Qur’an” and “The Life of the Prophet Muhammad,” introducing a 
more Islamic component to education.129 Though this bill has highlighted Turkey’s long-
established tensions between religion and secularism, it can also be viewed as the 
government’s way of imposing its own views onto Turkish society; in this case, a 
reflection of Erdoğan’s deep religiosity. 
In November 2013, Erdoğan sparked another public debate and received a lot of 
criticism when he condemned shared housing between male and female students in 
university dorms operated by state or private group houses. He defended potential 
government intervention by stating that mixed-student housing encourages depravity, 
drug trafficking, prostitution, and terrorism.130 The next day, Radikal published a story 
that a student’s house was raided by the police.131 However, government officials, 
particularly Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, have taken an opposite stance against 
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Erdoğan over the issue of mixed-gender student housing, almost leading to Arınç’s own 
resignation. This also led to student demonstrations, denouncing the interference of the 
government in private life.132 
 
Internet Control 
The internet has rapidly expanded to become a central mode of communication 
and accessibility of information. However, the AKP has put a lot of effort in keeping 
opposing opinions under control by limiting access to certain websites, starting with a 
YouTube ban in March 2007 when the Turkish courts banned the site due to video clips 
insulting Atatürk. YouTube was blocked sporadically until it was permanently lifted in 
2010.133  
During the AKP’s rule, thousands of websites have been blocked, including gay 
dating sites and news portals considered to be propaganda tools of Kurdish militants. 
Google reported last December that during the first six months of 2012, Turkish 
authorities have requested Google to delete nearly ten times more content from its sites 
than before. Subsequently in the next year, Google was asked to remove more than 
12,000 items, making Turkey the top country to remove Google’s content.134  
After the corruption probe in December 2013, the AKP stepped up its efforts to 
control internet sites in order to prevent social media from reporting on the scandal. On 
February 18, President Abdullah Gül signed a new Internet law, claiming it was a 
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necessary measure to protect personal privacy. The Internet law enables authorities to 
block access to web pages without a prior court order, in addition to collecting users’ 
browsing histories.135  
In the latest blow to Turkey’s democracy, the Turkish government blocked both 
Twitter and YouTube in March days before the Turkish 2014 local elections. In recent 
weeks, audio recordings have been released via Twitter and YouTube on an almost daily 
basis, alleged to be telephone conversations between senior government officials and 
businessmen that reveal corruption. The YouTube ban came as an immediate response to 
another leak exposing a discussion on the possibility of going to war with Syria.136 The 
prime minister’s office announced, “Twitter has been used as a means to carry out 
systematic character assassinations by circulating illegally acquired recordings, fake and 
fabricated records of wiretapping.”137  
After the AKP won the local elections in a landslide victory, the Turkish 
Constitutional Court lifted the Twitter ban, ruling it as contrary to fundamental rights and 
freedom of expression. A court in Ankara also lifted a ban on YouTube, though as of 
April 10, access to YouTube remains blocked.138 
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Implications of the Gezi Park Protests 
 This chapter concludes with the events of the Gezi Park protests, which best 
capture the resistance to the growing authoritarian AKP and the violation of fundamental 
rights, including the right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. It began in 
late May when a group of environmentalists initiated a peaceful sit-in in response to the 
government’s proposed development project in Gezi Park, one of the last green spaces in 
Istanbul. The project included the construction of a replica nineteenth century Ottoman 
barracks, a shopping mall, and a mosque. On May 28, 2013, the police arrived and broke 
up the group using excessive force. In a few days, the police launched a raid against the 
growing number of protesters using tear gas, pepper spray, excessive violence, and water 
cannons. As news spread across the country, protests grew into a mass anti-government 
mobilization, spanning to the cities of Ankara and Izmir. By mid-June, hundreds of 
thousands had participated in the “Gezi Park protests.”139  
The tactics employed by security forces across Turkey during the Gezi protests 
demonstrate the government's violation of fundamental rights and freedoms. First, the 
government violated the freedom of assembly as it allowed the police to disperse 
peaceful protests through indiscriminate and excessive use of tear gas and force. Police 
also used water cannons and plastic bullets against protesters. In addition to use of force, 
the police have detained a number of individuals, including doctors treating the injured 
and lawyers defending protesters’ rights, who were subjected to arbitrary and abusive use 
of force. The police repeatedly showed intolerance for any form of protest, including 
passive forms, such as what became known as the “standing man” protests where 
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protesters stood alone in silence in Taksim Square. However, rather than stopping the 
police abuse, the government sided against the protesters, condemning social media sites 
such as Twitter and Facebook that were being used to provide live coverage and spread 
the news by protestors and their supporters.140 According to a Turkish human rights 
organization, there were eight deaths as a result of the protests, 8,163 injured, 5,300 
individuals arrested, 160 kept in long-term detention, and many arbitrarily detained 
without charge for hours.141  
Secondly, the government violated freedom of expression. The protests sparked 
an intense period of pressure for media workers in Turkey as the government and media 
bosses clamped down on journalists attempting to report on the protests. As a result of 
their coverage of the Gezi Park protests, 22 journalists have been fired and 37 forced to 
quit, according to the Journalists Union of Turkey.142 The mainstream national media 
broadcasted little of the protest. CNN Türk’s decision to screen a documentary on 
penguins during the initial stages of the protests became a symbol of self-censorship in 
the national media.143  
 The Gezi protests was a new phenomenon in Turkey and vividly illustrates the 
tensions within Turkish society and its dissatisfaction with the Turkish government. In a 
commentary in Insight Turkey, Ete says that protesters take to the street when they feel 
helpless and defeated – a response when they see no alternative. Ete argues that this was 
the case in the Gezi protests, where protesters’ motivation was purely reactionary, as 
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evident in slogans such as “Enough.” The protesters were demonstrating to defend their 
lifestyles and prevent future policies that could further restrict their freedoms.144 
Similarly, Tayfun Atay, a professor at Middle East Technical University in Ankara, says 
that the demonstrations must be analyzed in the context of the AKP’s recent actions in 
Turkey, describing it as a “period of construction” when the AKP intensified its own 
morality in daily life and the secular public space.145 A survey conducted during the 
protests confirms these points. Ninety percent of responders answered that they were 
protesting on the streets because they were “disturbed by and unhappy with the 
authoritarian discourse and attitude of Prime Minister Erdoğan.” Eighty-five percent also 
agreed that the AKP had been increasingly interfering in people’s lives.146  
 The nationwide protests were aggravated by the authorities’ aggressive 
crackdown on the initial peaceful protests in Gezi Park, denying them the right to 
peaceful protest altogether. Yet, the underlying force behind the demonstrations was 
rooted in the fears and despair of the secular people about the increasing government 
pressure and interference in their personal lifestyles. The AKP failed to pass this major 
test for its commitment to Turkey’s democracy and its commitment to upholding 
fundamental human rights.  
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Turkey is a crucial ally for the west and for democracy, making Turkey’s 
democratic backslide a critical case study. Its internal affairs will affect its ability to 
engage with other international actors, many of which have a vital interest in seeing a 
democratic Turkey that can cooperate on strategic issues. Democratic backsliding in 
Turkey can also have major implications for nondemocratic countries, as the situation in 
Turkey may halt the democratizing processes in its neighboring countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa, which have looked to Turkey as a source of democratic inspiration. 
Most importantly however, democratic backsliding may lead to increasing oppression of 
the Turkish people, denying them universal human rights and freedoms. 
The Turkish case helps identify areas which need to be carefully observed and 
monitored to prevent backsliding in other countries experiencing decline. Signs of 
erosion of the highlighted five key areas should serve as a warning that requires an 
immediate response. Yet, each case of democratic backsliding will differ according to the 
country, and both preventative and corrective measures will also be country specific. 
Turkey has already passed initial signs of backsliding and is gradually picking up 
speed in its decline. This chapter provides policy recommendations specific to the 
Turkish case in order to prevent further democratic backsliding. Turkey’s democratic 
allies, specifically the United States and the European Union, can play an important role 
in encouraging and facilitating the process towards reversing Turkey’s course back to the 
right one. Both the U.S. and the EU have a genuine interest in seeing a democratic 
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Turkey, and thus, they should keep Turkey close and continue to directly and actively 
engage Turkish leaders. 
 
The United States  
Turkey has been an important American partner, especially in the Middle East. As 
NATO allies, the U.S.-Turkey alliance has long centered on cooperation over issues 
related to security and defense. However, these relations have deteriorated over the past 
several years as Turkey embraced an independent outlook which has tended to clash with 
Washington’s policy, including Turkey’s stance on Israel and its support for extremist 
groups in Syria. As democratic elements begin to deteriorate in Turkey, the United States 
needs to adopt a policy that addresses the reality of current events in Turkey rather than 
ignoring and denying Turkey’s increasing authoritarianism. In the past, Washington has 
only released statements of concern over Turkey’s situation – but this is not enough. The 
U.S. needs to directly address Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül and 
explain how Turkey’s democratic decline has been damaging relations and undermining 
joint efforts to achieve common goals. In addition to vocalizing concerns, the U.S. can 
further support Turkey’s democracy in the following ways: 
 Work collaboratively in establishing a longer-term Turkish policy that focuses on 
the stability of Turkey’s political institutions and freedom of its society. Their 
bilateral relationship should not only be centered on security and economic issues, 
but should integrate human rights and democracy as a basis for their partnership. 
U.S. and Turkish government officials should hold regular meetings to discuss 
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and implement ways to improve democratic elements in Turkey, including 
transparency in the government and open dialogue with media and civil society. 
 Use economic incentives to push for greater government accountability and 
transparency. The U.S. and the EU should use the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) as a way to expand opportunities in Turkey, 
including increasing free trade and allowing Turkey to participate in TTIP 
negotiations. Turkey’s customs union with the EU means that Turkey has high 
interests in the outcome of the TTIP; yet, Turkey has been denied a say in its 
implementation. Both the U.S. and the EU should find ways to include Turkey 
into this economic integration project.147  
 
The worst thing the U.S. can do is to isolate Turkey as punishment for its current 
domestic situation and specific political decisions. Rather, as an ally, Washington should 
offer advice both publicly and privately. However, it must consider the high levels of 
anti-Americanism within Turkey. According to Pew Research, an average of 75 percent 
have viewed the U.S. “unfavorably” in the past eleven years.148 Though anti-
Americanism in Turkey has generally derived from specific U.S. foreign policies, 
especially from the post 9/11 era,149 Erdoğan has been exploiting anti-American 
sentiment for domestic political reasons. He has instigated conspiracy theories by 
accusing external sources, including the U.S., for provoking and causing Turkey’s 
internal problems. These conspiracy theories have been gaining traction in Turkey, as 
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Erdoğan’s rhetoric has consistently framed the increasing number of domestic turmoil as 
a dark international conspiracy against Turkey and AKP rule. Though the Gülen 
movement has been the primary target for such conspiracies, Erdoğan has also targeted 
international actors, blaming western media, the EU, and the U.S. for being behind the 
Gezi protests.150 After the December 17 corruption probe, Erdoğan said in a speech in the 
town of Fatsa, “There are extremely dirty alliances in this set-up, dark alliances that 
cannot tolerate the new Turkey, the big Turkey...Turkey has never been subjected to such 
an immoral attack.”151 Erdoğan hinted at the direct involvement of the U.S. in the probes 
by claiming that “some ambassadors have been engaging in provocative actions…we do 
not have to keep you in our country.”152 Erdoğan’s rhetoric has further inflamed anti-
Americanism in Turkey through his support of conspiracy theories to divert domestic 
criticism from his leadership to external sources. This makes it even more crucial that the 
U.S. is careful not to antagonize or provoke further anti-Americanism by threatening or 
punishing the Turkish government for decisions that clash with Washington’s interests. 
 
The European Union 
 Though the European Union’s leverage diminished as accession talks stalled, the 
EU can still be an important actor in encouraging important reforms in Turkey. In the 
past, the possibility of EU membership served as a huge impetus for Turkey’s 
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democratization process.153 Yet, as the EU loses credibility in membership negotiations, 
Turkey’s interest in the union is fading, constraining the ability of both sides to better 
cooperate in political and economic issues.  
 Despite the stalling of accession talks, the EU and Turkey should continue the 
process of harmonization, which can reinvigorate Turkey’s push for reforms. Recently 
there has been a resumption of negotiations, including the “positive agenda” which 
commenced in May 2012, the opening of a new chapter of the acquis last year, and the 
recent agreement to pursue visa liberalization.154 The EU must continue to engage with 
Turkey while offering economic incentives to support Turkey’s democracy. Like the U.S., 
the EU must clearly state the negative consequences of democratic backsliding to 
prospective EU membership and Turkey’s economy. Some of the steps the EU can 
undertake include: 
 Complete the visa liberalization process that would allow Turkish citizens to 
travel visa-free to the EU in exchange for Turkey readmitting illegal migrants 
from the EU. Opening up travel to the EU is a huge incentive for Turkey and 
should be swiftly implemented.155 
 Correct the imbalance in the EU-Turkey customs union. Though Turkey is 
obligated to abide by the EU’s commercial policies, it does not have a say in the 
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policy negotiations. Turkey should be included in these economic negotiations, 
including the TTIP.156 
 Target the Turkish youth through EU programs such as the Erasmus student 
exchange program. These programs will strengthen Turkey’s civil society and 
foster liberal democracy, raising future leaders who have visions of Turkish 
democracy. 
 Renew impetus on accession negotiations. The EU should incentivize Turkey’s 
accession progress by providing a clear, dual conditionality accepted by both 
sides, laying the conditions for future ratification under EU criteria. As a first step, 
the EU should release the official criteria for opening more chapters of the 
accession acquis, especially chapters 23 on judiciary and fundamental rights and 
chapter 24 on justice, freedom, and security, which has been suggested by both 
German Foreign Minister Steinmeier and Turkey’s Foreign Minister 
Davutoglu.157 This will lead to much-needed reforms in those critical areas.  
 
However, the EU should not completely lose its credibility with the membership 
process or else it will cause further isolation from Turkey. If the EU is unwilling to offer 
Turkey membership in the long-run, it should offer a new partnership structure to Turkey 
in order to overcome this possible drift. Sinan Ülgen offers a framework where Turkey 
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can be offered “virtual EU membership.”158 Though virtual membership would mean that 
Turkey lacks the right to vote, it would be better than no membership at all. Turkey will 
be allotted some decision-making power and will be consulted in various EU committees. 
This will deepen cooperation and integration in areas such as mobility, trade, 
environment, and foreign and security policy. The EU is not cohesive in that some 
member states are already given special status due to opt-outs that choose to apply only 
certain EU policies. For example, the UK has opted out of the Schengen Area and 
Denmark has withdrawn from the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy.159 Thus, it 
is a real possibility that Turkey can also be given a special status. 
  
Turkey  
 As Turkey tries to gain more regional influence, it has been more independent and 
detached from its allies. Moreover, its pride and ambitions may prevent it from 
completely and candidly engaging with its allies, despite their offer to help. Nevertheless, 
democracy can only be truly built by internal dynamics, depending on the leaders and 
citizens who need to demonstrate strong support and commitment for the idea.  
 However, despite the local elections that were seen as a confidence vote for 
Erdoğan’s leadership, the results reinforce the existence of a huge obstacle within 
Turkish society: the extreme polarization of the Turkish people, which is divided between 
those who support Erdoğan and the AKP, and those who do not. This polarization, which 
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is deeply rooted in Turkish political and social life, hinders Turkey’s democratization 
process. There are many elements to this polarization, including secularism versus 
religion, authoritarianism versus democracy, the emergence of the powerful Anatolian 
business and political elite, and the weakening of the traditional Kemalist bureaucratic 
elite.160 The animosity and hostility between these two sides has begun to reach its peak, 
undermining prospects of a healthy democracy. Thus, polarization is one of the main 
areas the government needs to address. A relatively easy starting point for the 
government is to refrain from using polarizing rhetoric and discourse. Erdoğan’s rhetoric 
and actions have greatly contributed to reinforcing splits within Turkish society. 
Moreover, the government needs to transcend Turkey’s polarized society and engage 
with Turkey’s opposition parties and civil society groups. It should be tolerant and open 
to all, taking a conciliatory and inclusive stance. The government’s policies should aim to 
improve Turkey as a nation rather than achieve its own personal agenda.  
Likewise, the opposition needs to cease contributing to polarization as well, 
particularly the CHP which has primarily used tactics of insulting the AKP to gain 
supporters. The opposition is weak, and it needs to become more effective and 
constructive. It can do this by focusing more on the needs of the Turkish people rather 
than simply winning elections and defeating the AKP. In addition to political parties, 
other civil society groups need to stop confronting the government, primarily the Gülen 
movement. Their anti-democratic rivalry is undermining Turkey’s democracy, and the 
Gülen movement needs to return its attention and resources back to its original sphere 
and responsibilities as a social movement rather than a political one. 
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In addition to addressing Turkey’s polarization issues, the government can further 
strengthen Turkey’s democracy by doing the following: 
 Allow the press to operate free of government intimidation. The government must 
immediately stop all tactics to suppress media freedoms and should refrain from 
punishing critics of the government. 
 Maintain separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive branch. 
With the executive’s recent attempts at grabbing control over the judiciary, the 
executive has used the courts to prosecute its own opposition on many occasions. 
In order to properly uphold the rule of law, the judiciary needs to remain 
independent and separate from the Ministry of Justice. 
 Abolish the Anti-Terror Law and Article 301. The vague terms of the former 
allows a liberal application of the law, which has already resulted in numerous 
prosecutions and convictions of innocent people for terrorism, including 
independent journalists. Article 301 of the criminal code criminalizes “insulting 
the Turkish nation.”161 This too has been used too liberally, resulting in the 
prosecution of government critics.  
 Address corruption in the public procurement and privatization processes. In light 
of the December 17 corruption probes, there is a widespread distrust of the 
government. The government needs to improve transparency of public 
procurement in order to restore its image and the support of Turkish citizens. It 
should review and improve the housing system, including TOKİ.  
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Another crucial issue Turkey needs to address is its economy, which is suffering 
immensely from the political crisis. The record-low depreciation of the Turkish lira and 
the decreasing value of the Turkish stock market over the past few months have led to 
fears of a slowdown in foreign direct investment. Turkey has heavily depended on its 
stable lira and international connections for areas in trade, investment, research and 
technology, education, and security, and downgrades by rating agencies can pose serious 
challenges.162 Thus, the government needs to focus on its economy while keeping its 
relations with partner countries by amending domestic issues to reassure international 
markets. Moreover, this is an extremely important issue for the AKP itself because its 
economic problems are causing dissatisfaction within the rising business elites, who have 
emerged under AKP rule. These business elites depend on alliances with foreign 
businesses and on Turkey’s standing in international markets – if this fails, the AKP will 
lose a major group of supporters. 
In summary, the challenges of constructing and defending a democratic state are 
fundamentally ones the Turkish people must resolve.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
162 Morton I. Abramowitz and Eric S. Edelman, From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy 
(Washington, D.C.: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2013), 8.  
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IX. CONCLUSION 
 
 It is clear that Turkey has not yet completed the democratic consolidation 
expected by the international community. Rather, Turkey’s democratic successes are 
quickly unraveling, and Turkey is becoming increasingly authoritarian and unstable. If 
Turkey’s democratic backsliding is not checked, its hard-earned image that it has built 
over the last decades will be completely dismantled. This paper demonstrates the 
sequential effects of democratic backsliding in Turkey. Turkey is deteriorating quickly in 
a whirl of events, thus making it important to take a step back and identify wider trends. 
The events and steps taken by the government are not independent, exclusive events, but 
are inherently intertwined and connected to each other, where each authoritarian action 
has negative consequences leading to further backsliding. Like a domino effect, when one 
area falls under executive control, it affects other areas, inevitably causing them to also 
succumb to authoritarian control. The domino effect appears to be gaining momentum as 
demonstrated by the increasing number of evidence of democratic backsliding this past 
year. By fitting and analyzing these events in a timeline framework, the following 
characterizations of the democratic backsliding trend in Turkey can be made: 
 
1) Erdogan’s tendency to reduce democracy to the number of votes has given him 
the confidence to take authoritarian measures. A timeline of events shows that the 
first major signs of democratic backsliding occurred after the AKP’s reelection in 2007. 
As the AKP was intent in its first elections to prove to the Turkish people its commitment 
to create a new Turkey, it made huge efforts to fulfill its democratic promises and 
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transform the Turkish economy. Its achievements led to its victory in the 2007 elections. 
However, this reelection gave the AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan a boost in 
confidence, opening up an opportunity to stray away from democratic commitments and 
pursue other ambitions. Thus, since 2007, Erdoğan took the first steps in shaking 
democratic structures, seen by judicial reforms, the Ergenekon trials, and the clampdown 
on the Doğan Media Group. The AKP’s third reelection in 2011 clinched Erdoğan’s 
confidence by making the results clear: the opposition was weak and the AKP was strong. 
Erdoğan had unlimited power. Erdoğan has had a tendency to reduce democracy to 
elections, reflected in his speech during the Gezi Park protests, “If you gather 100,000 
people, I can gather a million.”163 Thus, as Erdoğan keeps on winning the votes, he 
becomes more self-assured of his actions and justifies them as legitimate.  
 
2) Media clampdowns have generally been a response by the government to deal 
with other domestic crises. The media chapter describes many different tactics the 
government has employed to suppress the media’s independent role. When analyzing the 
sequential timing of these clampdowns, the government has generally acted against the 
media as an immediate response to events that threaten the interests of the government. 
The government realizes the media’s ability to incite further opposition and attack the 
AKP’s image, and thus, the government’s natural reaction has been to lash out at the 
media every time. This trend has been seen time after time. The Deniz Feneri incident 
abroad ultimately led Doğan Media Group to sell its anti-government newspapers to a 
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pro-government group, the Ergenekon trials led to the arrest of journalists who spoke out 
against the government, and the Gezi protests led to mass firings of journalists and news 
editors. Media clampdown in Turkey has been facilitated by the government’s attempts to 
deal with its other opposition conflicts. 
 
3) The sequential events and effects are characterized by tit-for-tat exchanges within 
a polarized Turkish society, facilitating democratic backsliding. This “tit-for-tat” 
exchange with the government can mainly be seen with the judiciary and the Gülen 
movement. The Turkish Constitutional Court has traditionally been dominated by 
hardline secularists who have been trying to protect Turkish society from the 
authoritarian actions of the government. The Constitutional Court and the AKP have 
clashed numerous times, the first major incident occurring in 2007 when it tried to ban 
the AKP. Since then, the AKP has revamped its efforts to gain control over the judiciary. 
The Constitutional Court, however, has continued to play an independent role in recent 
months, ruling the recent Twitter ban as unconstitutional and also repealing the law 
restricting the independence of the HSYK. This will only prompt the AKP to devise new 
plans to suppress the independence of the Court.  
 The tension between the Gülen movement and the AKP has intensified in recent 
years. The movement to close the preparatory schools at the end of last year has caused 
the Gülen movement to take retaliatory measures, including the corruption probe against 
the government. The government swiftly responded by cracking down on the police and 
the judiciary, which are mainly composed of Gülenists. These tit-for-tat exchanges have 
only contributed to Turkey’s democratic backsliding as each side refuses to absorb the 
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last blow. The AKP will continue to take undemocratic measures to suppress opposition 
elements. 
 
However, one extremely important area that has not yet been covered is Turkish 
foreign policy and its relationship to Turkey’s democratic backsliding. Turkey’s domestic 
problems appear to be having negative reverberating effects on its foreign policy, 
identifying an area which requires further research: the impact of democratic backsliding 
on a country’s foreign policy. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu wrote in a 
Foreign Policy article, “Without a stable domestic order that meets its citizens’ demands 
for liberties, after all, Turkey cannot pursue a proactive foreign-policy agenda abroad.”164 
Indeed, the domestic crisis at home is reflected in Turkey’s failing foreign policy, which 
has been inconsistent and marked by a distinct lack of coherence.   
Domestic turmoil has become a distraction to Turkish foreign policy. As the 
government tried to find a way to respond to the Gezi Park protests and the corruption 
probes, it could not focus on its foreign policy. These backward steps away from 
democratic consolidation have impacted Turkey’s bid to the EU, and Turkey will need to 
find a way to get back on track if it ever hopes to acquire EU membership. Yet, in the 
process of handling these domestic problems, the AKP has also made allegations that 
foreign powers are behind the recent domestic crises. Not only has Erdoğan accused the 
involvement of Gülen, but he has also referred to Israel and the U.S. as instigators. This 
has only damaged the relationship with the U.S. and worsened the already-broken 
relationship with Israel.  
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The more obvious link between Turkey’s failing foreign policy to its domestic 
problems at home is that democratic backsliding has caused it to stray away from the 
support of democratic countries of the west. Turkey has taken increasingly bold, 
unilateral actions, which have not only come at odds with the policies of the U.S., but 
have backfired, leading to failed results. This is especially seen in Turkey’s approach to 
the Arab Spring, where Erdoğan enthusiastically supported the Islamist Sunni political 
movements. In Libya, Turkey was hesitant to endorse a NATO operation, but it finally 
relented and became a passive player in the process. In Egypt, Turkey was a firm 
supporter of the elected President Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
However, Morsi was overthrown by the military on July 3, 2013, leaving Erdoğan with 
the image of supporting the wrong side. The situation with Syria is worse. Relations with 
Turkey and Syria had improved under Davutoğlu’s “zero problems with neighbors” 
strategy. Yet, the Arab uprisings that spread to Syria threatened this relation. Turkey tried 
to convince President Assad to address the protestors’ concerns, but was completely 
ignored. In response, Turkey condemned Assad and took a very fierce stance against his 
regime, leading to seriously deteriorated relations. Since then, Turkey has been involved 
in assisting the opposition through supplying training, weapons, and even finances. 
Turkey has also allegedly been supporting extremist groups in Syria, including Al-Qaeda-
related elements, as was revealed after a bomb attack in Reyhanli, a town in southern 
Turkey.165 The chaotic nature of Turkey’s foreign policy has been reinforced by further 
conspiracy theories at home, including the recent YouTube leaks that revealed 
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discussions of a potential military intervention into Syria, and journalist Seymour Hersh’s 
wild claim that Turkey was responsible for the sarin gas attacks in Syria.166  
There is a parallel between the government’s policies at home and abroad. 
Democratic backsliding is marked by the executive’s grabs for control. Likewise, the 
resulting failing foreign policy is marked by a unilateral, imperialist nature rather than a 
multilateral approach. Thus, Turkey and the U.S. have consistently been at odds over 
their policy towards the Middle East, and Turkey now risks isolation. A Turkey 
committed to democracy would look towards the U.S. and Europe and strengthen its 
democratic allies instead of extending its authoritarian nature to the international sphere. 
Moreover, it is important to note that Turkey’s ability to influence the rest of the Arab 
world is dependent on its own democracy. Turkey must be able to overcome its own 
democratic problems; otherwise, it clearly undermines Turkey’s model for 
democratization in other countries and its regional standing in the Arab world.  
 
It is a paradox that the same party that has helped democratize Turkey is the same 
party that is facilitating its backsliding. The recent local elections in March only 
demonstrated that Erdoğan is unbeatable and that the process to halting democratic 
backsliding will be extremely long and difficult. The AKP’s authoritarian tendencies are 
a reflection of the character of Erdoğan himself, making the future of Erdoğan crucial to 
the future path of Turkey. Thus, with Erdoğan’s ambitions to become president, the 
future of Turkey is far from certain. Can Erdoğan succeed in winning this summer’s 
presidential elections? If he does, will he centralize all power in the office of the 
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80 
 
president? What will this mean for the future of the AKP if it loses its leader and its 
driving force?  
Turkey’s democracy has matured beyond the point of passively accepting 
Erdoğan’s version of a democracy, where election votes are enough to legitimize his rule. 
Erdoğan is losing legitimacy every time he challenges the rule of law, civil liberties, and 
transparency in policymaking, and the instability in Turkey can no longer be appeased 
simply by winning elections. Discontent in Turkish society will not simply disappear, 
even if Erdoğan’s AKP wins the next general elections scheduled for 2015. Turkey can 
only make its full democratic transition when it understands that democratic legitimacy 
goes beyond the ballot box and it makes a genuine commitment to rebuild a liberal 
democracy. It needs to make a commitment now to prevent further democratic 
backsliding and needs to find a way to muddle out of the mess it has created. The success 
of reversing this decline primarily depends on the will and determination of the leaders 
and citizens of Turkey, and it is up to them to leave a legacy of consolidating democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
“19 sentenced to life in Turkey’s Ergenekon coup plot trial, including ex-military chief.”  
Hürriyet Daily News, August 5, 2013.  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/Default.aspx?PageID=238&NID=52034. 
 
Abramowitz, Morton I., and Eric S. Edelman. From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S.  
Turkey Policy. Washington, D.C.: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2013. 
 
Açıkgöz, Sevgi. “The deficits of the opposition parties in Turkey.” Today’s Zaman, April  
4, 2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/blog/sevgi-kuru-acikgoz_343827_the-
deficits-of-the-opposition-parties-in-turkey.html. 
 
“ ‘Alo Fatih’ Habertürk gazetesinin künyesinden çıktı.” Radikal, March 4, 2014.  
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/alo_fatih_haberturk_gazetesinin_kunyesinden_
cikti-1179441. 
 
“AK Party’s biggest corruption case shows stakes of press censorship, transparency  
woes.” Today’s Zaman, August 4, 2013. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
322660-biggest-corruption-case-shows-costs-of-press-censorship.html. 
 
Akyol, Mustafa. “Turkey’s media manipulation: from denial to ‘so what?’”Al Monitor,  
February 13, 2014. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/turkey-
media-manipulation.html#. 
 
Akyol, Mustafa. “What you should know about Turkey’s AKP-Gulen conflict.” Al  
Monitor,January 3, 2014. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/akp-gulen-conflict-guide.html#. 
 
“Alcohol in Turkey: Not so good for you.” The Economist, June 1, 2013.  
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21578657-mildly-islamist-government-
brings-tough-alcohol-restrictions-not-so-good-you. 
 
Arabacı, Ahmet. “Explaining Transformation of Turkish Civil Society in the EU  
Accession Process.” Insight Turkey 10.4 (2008): 77-94.  
 
Asma, Gizem. “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: A comparison of Bush and Obama Periods.”  
Masters Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2013.  
 
Atay, Tayfun. “The Clash of the ‘Nations’ in Turkey: Reflections on the Gezi Park  
Incident.” Insight Turkey 15 (2013): 39-44. 
 
Atiyas, İzak. “Economic Institutions and Institutional Change in Turkey during the  
Neoliberal Era.” New Perspectives on Turkey 14 (2012): 45-69. 
 
82 
 
Bali, Aslı. “The Perils of Judicial Independence: Constitutional Transition and the  
Turkish Example.” Virginia Journal of International Law 52 (2012): 235-320. 
 
Banac, Ivo. Eastern Europe in Revolution. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992. 
 
Baran, Zeyno. “Turkey Divided.” Journal of Democracy 19.1 (2008): 55-69. 
 
Basdeki, Lamprini. “The role of EU conditionality in the Turkish democratization  
process.” Masters Thesis, University of Southern Denmark, 2012. 
 
“Başbakan: Evinde ne var ne yok çıkar; Oğlu: 30 milyon daha var, eritemedik.” T24,  
February 24, 2014. http://t24.com.tr/haber/iste-basbakan-ile-oglu-arasinda-
gectigi-iddia-edilen-gorusmelerin-icerigi/251917. 
 
Baydar, Yavuz. “Erdogan’s dream turns into a nightmare.” Al Monitor, December 26,  
2013. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/originals/2013/12/turkey-erdogan-
resignation-ministers-akp-power-corruption.html. 
 
Brezinski, Zbigniew. “The Primacy of History and Culture.” Journal of Democracy 12.4  
(2001): 20-26. 
 
Butler, Daren. “Turkey purges hundreds more police over graft probe, media reports.”  
Reuters, January 31, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/31/us-turkey-
corruption-idUSBREA0U0OL20140131. 
 
Butler, Daren. “Turkey says Twitter ‘biased,’ did nothing to stop ‘character  
assassinations’.” Reuters, March 22, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article 
/2014/03/22/us-turkey-election-idUSBREA2K0NK20140322. 
 
Bülbül, Kudret, and İbrahim Kalın and Berat Özipek. “Turkish Perceptions of the West.”              
Insight Turkey 10.1 (2008): 129-148.  
 
“Can Dündar dismissed from daily Milliyet for critical Gezi stance.” Hürriyet Daily  
News, August 1, 2013. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/can-dundar-dismissed-
from-daily-milliyet-for-critical-gezi-
stance.aspx?pageID=238&nID=51871&NewsCatID=339. 
 
Cengiz, Demet. “Turkey’s liquor sector concerned over decline in consumption.”  
Hürriyet Daily News, April 5, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-
liquor-sector-concerned-over-decline-in-
consumption.aspx?PageID=238&NID=64563&NewsCatID=345. 
 
Ciddi, Sinan. “Turkey’s September 12, 2010 Referendum.” MERIA Journal 15 (2011).  
http://www.gloria-center.org/2011/12/turkey%E2%80%99s-september-12-2010-
referendum/. 
83 
 
Colombo, Jesse. “Why the Worst is still ahead for Turkey’s Bubble Economy.” Forbes  
March 5, 2014. http://www.forbes.com/sites/jessecolombo/2014/03/05/why-the-
worst-is-still-ahead-for-turkeys-bubble-economy/. 
 
Corke, Susan, et al. Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey. New  
York: Freedom House, 2014. 
 
Çağaptay, Soner. “AKP, alcohol, and government-engineered social change in Turkey.”  
Hürriyet Daily News, October 5, 2010. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default. 
aspx?pageid=438&n=0510150916466-2010-05-10.  
 
Çongar, Yasemin. “Erdogan’s ex-confidant Bayraktar: Will he speak?” Al Monitor,  
January 5, 2014. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/01/erdogan-
bayraktar-corruption-resignation-gulen-chp.html. 
 
Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University  
Press, 1971. 
 
Davutoğlu, Ahmet. “Zero Problems in a New Era.” Foreign Policy, March 21, 2013.  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/21/zero_problems_in_a_new_era_ 
turkey. 
 
Dettmer, James. “Turkey’s Erdogan Condemns Coed Dormitories.” The Daily Beast,  
November 12, 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/witw/ 
articles/2013/11/12/turkey-s-erdogan-condemns-coed-dormitories.html. 
 
Diamond, Larry. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: The Johns  
Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
 
Dombey, Daniel, and Piotr Zalewski. “Turkey probe underlines links between  
construction and politics.” Financial Times, January 1, 2014. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ef8b4e0e-72d5-11e3-b05b-
00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2x27fWwaB. 
 
Dombey, Daniel. “Turkey sees political shift with release of imprisoned general.”  
Financial Times, March 7, 2014. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3ea49568-a61b-
11e3-8a2a-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2zZyaWWGv. 
 
“Efes Pilsen to change name to Anadolu Efes.” Hürriyet Daily News, October 5, 2011.  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=efes-pilsen-to-
change-name-to-anadolu-efes-2011-05-10. 
 
“Erdoğan neden 3 çocuk istdeğini açıkladı?” Milliyet, January 2, 2013.  
http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/erdogan-neden-3-cocuk-istedigini-acikladi-
/siyaset/siyasetdetay/02.01.2013/1650260/default.htm. 
84 
 
“Erdoğan’s political ambitions clash with Turkey’s long-term interests.” Today’s Zaman,  
April 13, 2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-344373-erdogans-political-
ambitions-clash-with-turkeys-long-term-interests.html. 
 
Ergin, Oray. “The Silence of Surrender: Erdogan’s War on Independent Media.” World  
Affairs (2013). http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/issue/novemberdecember-
2013. 
 
Ete, Hatem. “The Political Reverberations of the Gezi Protests.” Insight Turkey 15 (2013):  
15-25. 
 
Fraser, Suzan. “326 Convicted in Turkey Military Coup Plot.” Associated Press,  
September 21, 2012. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/verdict-expected-turkish-coup-
plot-trial. 
 
Gezi Park Protests. London: Amnesty International, 2013. 
 
Gibler, Douglas M. and Kirk A. Randazzo. “Testing the Effects of Independent  
Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding.” American Journal of 
Political Science 55.3 (2011): 696-709. 
 
“Gov’t set to tighten grip on public tenders amid graft woes.” Today’s Zaman, January 9,  
2014. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-336198-govt-set-to-tighten-grip-on-
public-tenders-amid-graft-woes.html. 
 
Göksel, Diba N., and Rana B. Güneş. “The Role of NGOs in the European Integration  
Process: The Turkish Expereince.” South European Society & Politics 10 (2005): 
57-72. 
 
Gumuscu, Sebnem, and Deniz Sert. “The March 2009 Local Elections and the  
Inconsistent Democratic Transformation of the AKP Party in Turkey.” Middle 
East Critique 19 (2010): 55-70.  
 
“Gülen’i bitirme kararı 2004’te MGK’da alındı.” Taraf, November 28, 2013.  
http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber-gulen-i-bitirme-karari-2004-te-mgk-da-alindi-
140671/. 
 
Hendrick, Joshua, D. “Media Wars and the Gülen Factor in the New Turkey.” Middle  
East Report (2011): 40-46. 
 
Hendrick, Joshua, D. Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the  
World. New York: New York University Press, 2013. 
 
Hersh, Seymour M. “The Red Line and the Rat Line.” London Review of Books 36 (2014):  
21-24.  
85 
 
Hoffman, Max, and Michael Werz. Freedom of the Press and Expression in Turkey.  
Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2013.  
 
Houle, Christian. “Inequality and Democracy.” World Politics 61.4 (2009): 589-622. 
http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html. 
 
Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.  
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 
 
Idiz, Semih. “Erdogan Blames International Conspiracy for Protests.” Al Monitor, June  
14, 2013. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/erdogan-gezi-
conspiracy-taksim-governance-authoritarian-akp.html#. 
 
Ishiyama, John T. and Matthew Velten. ”Presidential Power and Democratic  
Development in Post-Communist Politics.” Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies 31 (1998): 217-233. 
 
Jenkins, Gareth. “Changing of the Guard: Judicial Reforms Reinforce Concerns about the  
AKP’s Increasing Authoritarianism.” Turkey Analyst 3 (2010). 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2010/101108A.html. 
 
Jenkins, Gareth. “The Ergenekon Releases and Prospects for the Rule of Law in Turkey.”  
Turkey Analyst 7 (2014). http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-
analyst-articles/item/96-the-ergenekon-releases-and-prospects-for-the-rule-of-
law-in-turkey.html. 
 
Jenkins, Gareth. “Turkey’s Latest Crisis.” Survival 50.5 (2008): 5-12. 
 
Kapstein, Ethan B. and Nathan Converse. “Why democracies fail.” Journal of  
Democracy 19.4 (2008): 57-68. 
 
Kaya, M. Kemal, and Halil M. Karaveli. “Remolding Compulsory Education, the AKP  
Erases a Secularist Legacy – and Seeks to Check the Gülen Brotherhood.” Turkey 
Analysis 5 (2012). 
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/120402a.html. 
 
Kirişci, Kemal. “Turkey and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.”  
Brookings (2013). http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/ 
2013/09/turkey%20transatlantic%20trade%20investment%20partnership%20kiris
ci/turkey%20and%20ttip.pdf. 
 
Kirkeser, Serpil. “HSYK 271 hakim ve savcının görev yerlerini değiştirdi.” Radikal,  
March 23, 2014. 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/yeni_hsyk_kararnamesi_kabul_edildi-1182739. 
 
86 
 
Koplow, Michael. “Politics as Usual: The Battle for the Turkish Judiciary.” World  
Politics Review (2014). http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13494/ 
politics-as-usual-the-battle-for-the-turkish-judiciary. 
 
Kubicek, Paul. “Democratization and Relations with the EU in the AK Party Period: Is  
Turkey Really Making Progress?” Insight Turkey 15 (2012): 41-49. 
 
Kurlantzick, Joshua. Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and the  
World Wide Decline of Representative Government. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013. 
 
Licursi, E.P. “The Ergenekon Case and Turkey’s Democratic Aspirations.” Freedom  
House (2012). http://www.freedomhouse.org/blog/ergenekon-case-and-
turkey%E2%80%99s-democratic-aspirations#.U1dSEfldUud. 
 
Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. Problems in Democratic Transition and Consolidation:  
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996. 
 
Mavuş, Merve, and Arif Oduncu, and Didem Güneş. “The Possible Effects of  
Transatlantic Trade and Investment  Partnership (TTIP) on Turkish Economy.” 
Munich Personal RePEc Archive (2013). http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/51900/. 
 
McFaul, Michael. Post-Communist Politics: Democratic Prospects in Russia and Eastern  
Europe. Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
1993. 
 
“Minister confesses to TOKI fraud in govt’s biggest corruption scandal yet.” Today’s  
Zaman, November 23, 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-299126-
minister-confesses-to-toki-fraud-in-govts-biggest-corruption-case-yet.html.  
 
Misztal, Blaise, and Jessica Michek. “The Separation of Powers in Turkey: Erdoğan vs.  
The Judiciary.” Bipartisan Policy, April 21, 2014. 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/foreignpolicy/2014/04/21/separation-powers-
turkey. 
 
Müftüler-Baç, Meltem, and E. Fuat Keyman. “The Era of Dominant-Party Politics.”  
Journal of Democracy 23 (2012): 85-99. 
 
“New details revealed about Turkey’s ongoing graft probe.” Hürriyet Daily News,  
December 18, 2013. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/new-details-revealed-
about-turkeys-ongoing-graft-probe-
.aspx?pageID=238&nID=59792&NewsCatID=341. 
 
 
87 
 
“No suspects left in jail in Turkey’s corruption probe.” Hürriyet Daily News, February 28,  
2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/no-suspects-left-in-jail-in-turkeys-
corruption-probe.aspx?PageID=238&NID=63045&NewsCatID=338. 
 
O’Donnell, Guillermo. “Illusions about Consolidation.” Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996):  
34-51. 
 
Oktem, Kerem. “Turkey elections: Democratic chance or authoritarian restoration?” Al  
Jazeera,April 5, 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/turkey-
elections-democratic-chan-20144582813567179.html. 
 
“Opinion of the United States.” Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, last modified  
July 2013. 
http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/survey/all/response/Unfavorable/. 
 
Öğünç, Pınar. “Tophane’de evi ‘basılan’ bir kadın anlatıyor.” Radikal, November 8, 2013.  
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/tophanede_evi_basilan_bir_kadin_anlatiyor-
1159754. 
 
Öniş, Ziya. “Sharing Power: Turkey’s Democratization Challenge in the Age of the AKP  
Hegemony.” Insight Turkey 15 (2012): 103-122. 
 
Özbudun, Ergun, and Ömer Gençkaya. Democratization and the Politics of Constitution- 
Making in Turkey. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009. 
 
Özcan, Celal. “Berlin urges EU to keep doors open to Ankara.” Hürriyet Daily News,  
February 4, 2014. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/berlin-urges-eu-to-keep-
doors-open-to-ankara.aspx?PageID=238&NID=61965&NewsCatID=351. 
 
Özer, Evren, and S. Erdem Türközü. “Gezi Parkı Eylemleri Bilgi Notu-02 Ağustos 2013.”  
Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı (2013). http://arsiv1.tihv.org/index.php?gezi-park-
eylemleri-bilgi-notu-02-austos-2013. 
 
Özerkan, Fulya. “Dueling narratives of news media freedom in Turkey.” Hürriyet Daily  
News, March 15, 2011. 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=war-against-
media-damage-turkeys-model-muslim-democracy-image-2011-03-15. 
 
Özler, Ş. İlgü, and Ani Sarkissian. “Stalemate and Stagnation in Turkish Democratization:  
The Role of Civil Society and Political Parties.” Journal of Civil Society 7 (2011): 
368-384. 
 
Pamuk, Humeyra, and Ece Toksabay. “Turkey’s Erdogan says ‘dark alliances’ behind  
graft inquiry.” Reuters, December 21, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article 
/2013/12/21/us-turkey-corruption-idUSBRE9BJ1AI20131221. 
88 
 
Parkinson, Joe, and Emre Peker. “Turkey Muzzles YouTube, Media Ahead of Elections.”  
The Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304418404579465283912697784?mg=reno64-
wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB1000142405270230
4418404579465283912697784.html. 
 
Pierini, Marc. “Individual Freedoms in Turkey.” Carnegie Endowment for International  
Peace (2013). http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/09/09/individual-freedoms-in-
turkey/gml8#. 
 
“PM Erdoğan calls on demonstrators to end Gezi Park protest, no step back from project.”  
Hürriyet Daily News, June 1, 2013. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pm-
erdogan-calls-on-demonstrators-to-end-gezi-park-protest-no-step-back-from-
project.aspx?pageID=238&nID=48020&NewsCatID=338. 
 
“President Gül approves bill emboldening gov’t control over judiciary.” Cihan, February  
26, 2014. http://en.cihan.com.tr/news/President-Gul-approves-bill-emboldening-
gov-t-control-over-judiciary_1705-CHMTM1MTcwNS80. 
 
Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi.  
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Wellbeing in the World, 
1950-1990. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
 
“Ricciardone refutes claims US ‘behind Turkey graft probe’.” Hürriyet Daily News,  
December 21, 2013. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ricciardone-refutes-
claims-us-behind-turkey-graft-probe-
.aspx?PageID=238&NID=59938&NewsCatID=315. 
 
Rittberger, Berthold, Dirk Leuffen, and Frank Schimmelfennig. “Differentiated  
Integration of Core State Powers.” In Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The 
European Integration of Core State Powers, edited by Philipp Genschel and 
Markus Jachtenfuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
 
“Roadmap Towards a Visa-Free Regime With Turkey.” European Commission.  
December 16, 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-
new/news/news/docs/20131216-roadmap_towards_the_visa-
free_regime_with_turkey_en.pdf http://www.iai.it/pdf/gte/gte_pb_11.pdf. 
 
Rodeheffer, Luke. “A Vast Network of Corruption is Upending Turkey’s Government as  
Three More Officials Resign.” Business Insider, December 25, 2013. 
http://www.businessinsider.com/corruption-networks-in-turkey-2013-12. 
 
Rodriguez, Carmen, et al. Turkey’s Democratization Process. New York: Routledge,  
2014. 
 
89 
 
Rubin, Michael. “Erdogan, Ergenekon, and the Struggle for Turkey.” Mideast Monitor  
(2008). http://www.meforum.org/1968/erdogan-ergenekon-and-the-struggle-for-
turkey. 
 
Seufert, Günter. “Is the Fethullah Gülen Movement Overstretching Itself?” Research  
Paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2014. 
 
Silverman, Reuben. “Justice and Development in the Marketplace: Business and Politics  
in the AKP-Era Turkey.” Masters Thesis, University of Washington, 2012. 
 
Snyder, Jack. From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New  
York: WW Norton and Co., 2000. 
 
Srivastava, Mehul, and Benjamin Harvey. “Erdogan Eyes on ‘Crazy Projects’ Links  
Turkey Scandals to Builder.” Bloomberg, January 5, 2014. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-05/erdogan-eye-on-crazy-projects-
links-turkey-scandal-to-builders.html. 
 
Taşpınar, Ömer. “The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey.” Brookings (2006).  
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2005/11/16turkey%20ta
spinar/taspinar20051116.pdf. 
 
Tattersall, Nick, and Ece Toksabay. “Turkish editor hits out at media coercion under  
Erdogan.” Reuters, February 11, 2014. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/us-turkey-idUSBREA1A1I120140211. 
 
Tol, Gönül. “The Clash of Former Allies: The AKP versus the Gulen Movement.” Middle  
East Institute (2014). http://www.mei.edu/content/clash-former-allies-akp-versus-
gulen-movement. 
 
Toprak, Binnaz. “Islam and Democracy in Turkey.” Turkish Studies 6.2 (2005): 167-186. 
 
Turkey’s Local Elections: Actors, Factors, and Implications. Washington D.C.:  
Bipartisan Policy Center, 2014. 
 
“Turkey drops anti-abortion legislation.” Al Jazeera,June 22, 2012.  
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/06/2012622811474159.html.  
 
“Turkey keeps YouTube block despite court rulings.” Reuters, April 10, 2014.  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/10/us-turkey-youtube-
idUSBREA390J320140410. 
 
“Turkey passes law to shut down cram schools.” Hürriyet Daily News, March 2, 2014.  
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-passes-law-to-shut-down-cram-
schools.aspx?pageID=238&nID=63082&NewsCatID=338. 
90 
 
“Turkey’s international building boom.” CNN, November 1, 2012.  
http://business.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/01/turkeys-international-building-boom/. 
 
“Turkey’s Internet Crackdown.” The New York Times, February 21, 2014.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/opinion/turkeys-internet-
crackdown.html?_r=1. 
 
“Turkey Strongly Urged to Liberalize Article 301.” Freedom House, November 7, 2007.  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/turkey-strongly-urged-liberalize-article-
301#.U1vtX_ldWSo. 
 
“Turkish court bans YouTube access.” BBC News, March 7, 2007.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6427355.stm. 
 
“Turkish journalists fired over coverage of Gezi Park protests.” The Independent, July 23,  
2013. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkish-journalists-fired-
over-coverage-of-gezi-park-protests-8727133.html. 
 
“Turkish Parliament approves controversial intel bill.” The Journal of Turkish Weekly  
(2014). http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/165801/turkish-parliament-approves-
controversial-intel-bill.html. 
 
Tuysuz, Gul, and Anna Ozbek. “Turkish women rally against plans to restrict access to  
abortion.” CNN, June 17, 2012.  
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/17/world/europe/turkey-abortion-rally/index.html. 
 
Türkmen, Füsun. “The European Union and Democratization in Turkey: The Role of the  
Elites.” Human Rights Quarterly 30 (2008): 146-163. 
 
Uskul, Zafer. “Turkey’s Democratization and the European Union.” Turkish Policy  
Quarterly (2002). http://www.turkishpolicy.com/article/58/turkeys-
democratization-and-the-european-union-fall-2002/. 
 
Ülgen, Sinan. “Avoiding a Divorce: A Virtual EU Membership for Turkey.” Carnegie  
Endowment for International Peace (2012). http://carnegieeurope.eu/2012/12/05/ 
avoiding-divorce-virtual-eu-membership-for-turkey/eqsb#.  
 
Zihnioğlu, Özge. European Union Civil Society Policy and Turkey. New York: Palgrave  
Macmillan, 2013.  
 
Zihnioğlu, Özge. “Polarization and Democratization in Turkey.” Reflections Turkey,  
April 2012. http://www.reflectionsturkey.com/?p=224. 
